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The June 2013 disclosure that the National Security Agency collects information on U.S. 
citizens revived the debate over the proper balance between national security and civil 
liberties. Central to the conversation is the concept of privacy. If the government is going 
to collect intelligence on individuals in order to defeat terrorism, then it must penetrate 
the veil of privacy.  
The outcome of the security versus privacy debate relies on three main factors: 1) 
the nature of the threat; 2) the effectiveness of intelligence methods taken by the 
government to counter that threat; and 3) the effect those intelligence efforts have on 
Americans’ privacy. Although imprecise and controversial, methods for measuring the 
threat and the effectiveness of intelligence efforts against that threat exist in various 
forms. It does not appear, however, that the impact of surveillance on privacy is 
measured in any useful way. This thesis addresses the problem of measuring privacy 
costs by examining the following questions: What elements of government surveillance 
programs and privacy expectations must be taken into account?  What level of domestic 
surveillance is acceptable to the American public?  And finally, how can we measure the 
cost of privacy to better inform the security versus liberty debate? 
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 I. SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The June 2013 disclosure that the National Security Agency (NSA) collects 
information on U.S. citizens revived the debate over the proper balance between national 
security and civil liberties. The current iteration of the dispute focuses on the use of 
domestic surveillance tools to support the state’s interest in protecting against terrorism 
versus society’s interest in civil liberties. Central to the conversation is the concept of 
privacy because it is “the one aspect of liberty that inhibits the government’s acquisition 
of information.”1  Thus, if the government is going to collect intelligence on individuals 
in order to defeat terrorism, then it must penetrate the veil of privacy.  
The outcome of the security-versus-privacy debate relies on three main factors: 1) 
the nature of the threat; 2) the effectiveness of intelligence methods taken by the 
government to counter that threat; and 3) the effect those intelligence efforts have on 
Americans’ privacy.  If the purpose of the debate is to reconcile the tensions between 
competing security and liberty interests, the fundamental question is how do we measure 
each component in order to balance the scale?  What values are we to give to threat, 
intelligence, and privacy in order to correctly convert the gain on one side with a 
proportionate, acceptable loss on the other?  Although imprecise and controversial, 
methods for measuring the threat and the effectiveness of intelligence efforts against that 
threat exist in various forms. It does not appear, however, that the impact of surveillance 
on privacy is measured in any useful way.   
This thesis addresses the problem of measuring privacy costs by examining the 
following questions: What elements of government surveillance programs and privacy 
expectations must be taken into account?  What level of domestic surveillance is 
acceptable to the American public?  And finally, how can we measure the cost of privacy 
to better inform the security versus liberty debate? 
1 Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge is Power in American National Security (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 163, quoted in Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of 
Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2009), 242. 
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 B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Discussions about the tensions between security and liberty usually come down to 
three core arguments. The primacy of security position argues that the threat is high, and 
thus security trumps concerns over civil liberties. Conversely, the defense of liberty 
argument tends to undervalue the threat while making civil liberties absolute and non-
sacrificial. Between these two poles rests a more practical but flawed approach, referred 
to here as the balancing act, which argues for a balance between the competing security 
and liberty interests.  
Central to the primacy of security position is the argument that without security, 
there is no freedom. Therefore, individual rights are submissive to overall security 
concerns.2  Proponents argue that the historical record favors this side of the debate. They 
are quick to point out that during the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the 
Cold War, up until the post-Vietnam era, the state routinely infringed on civil liberties in 
order to protect the country from threats.3  Because security is a prerequisite for freedom, 
the logic continues, the state is free to do anything necessary.4  In the extreme form, 
Richard Posner goes so far as to argue the government has the moral duty “to violate 
legal, including constitutional, rights when necessary to avoid catastrophic harm to the 
nation.”5  This position also holds that the Constitution does not specifically provide a 
right to privacy anyway, and, even if it did, the status of civil liberties return once the 
threat is defeated.6  A fundamental challenge to the primacy of security position is that 
2 Alan F. Westin, “How the Public Sees the Security-versus-Liberty Debate,” in Protecting What 
Matters: Technology, Security, and Liberty since 9/11, ed. Clayton Northouse (Washington, DC: 
Brookings, 2005), 19; Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National 
Emergency (New York: Oxford University, 2006), 4; Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False 
Tradeoff between Privacy and Security (New Haven: Yale University, 2011), 209. 
3 Jerel A. Rosati, “At Odds with One Another: The Tension between Civil Liberties and National 
Security in Twentieth-Century America,” in American National Security and Civil Liberties in an Era of 
Terrorism, ed. David. B. Cohen and John W. Wells (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 11–12; 
Solove, Nothing to Hide, 55–56, 59.  
4 Julian Richards, “Intelligence Dilemma?  Contemporary Counter-terrorism in a Liberal Democracy,” 
Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 5 (2012): 764.  
5 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, 14.  
6 Ibid., 127; Solove, Nothing to Hide, 60–61. 
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 security is more than physical threats; defending democracy also “requires the defense of 
democracy’s ideals.”7   
The defense of liberty school directly challenges the logic of the security first 
position through five main counterarguments. First, the historical record demonstrates 
contractions of liberties during war in what is otherwise an expansion of civil liberties 
over time.8  Second, justifications are usually based on a preoccupation with internal 
threats during war, with questionable validity and only the hope, not assurance, that 
liberties will return after the threat ceases.9  Third, there is no correlation between 
decreasing liberty and increased security.10  Authors such as Bruce Schneier argue, “bad 
security can be worse than no security” because of its negative effects on liberties without 
any positive gain for security.11  Fourth, if the Constitution is not a suicide pact, “neither 
is war a blank check”12—meaning there must be limits to state powers even in the face of 
a persistent, deadly threat. Fifth, even with multiple attacks on the scale of 9/11, terrorism 
is not an existential threat, while eroding liberties is.13  Therefore, efforts that weaken the 
Constitution are a bigger threat to the state than terrorism.14  The basic conclusion of this 
school is that the defense of liberty supersedes all other considerations; subjecting rights 
to security interests makes the cure for terrorism worse than the infirmity.   
At the core of the defense of liberty school of thought is the simple but profound 
premise that civil liberties are absolute, unalienable rights that cannot be broken no 
matter what the threat is.15  Derived from this underlying position is the conclusion that 
7 Brian Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2006): 176, quoted in Treverton, Intelligence for Age of Terror, 261. 
8 Rosati, “At Odds with One Another,” 11, 23–24. 
9 Ibid.; Solove, Nothing to Hide, 60–61. 
10 Solove, Nothing to Hide, 34.  
11 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World (New York: 
Copernicus, 2003), 10,14. 
12 Treverton, Intelligence for Age of Terror, 253. 
13 Ibid., 261. 
14 Westin, “How Public Sees Security-versus-Liberty Debate,” 19.  
15 David B. Cohen and John W. Wells, American National Security and Civil Liberties in an Era of 
Terrorism, 1.  
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 intelligence collection that infringes on liberty is unethical, and therefore must be avoided 
even if it is effective against a threat.16  This, however, is an unsustainable application of 
security concerns. Just as national security means very little if it destroys liberty, so, too, 
is liberty meaningless without physical security. Failing to recognize this will turn “give 
me liberty, or give me death”17 into a near certainty of having both liberty and death.   
The balancing act, the third approach, criticizes the first two for discrediting the 
debate by applying extreme arguments.18  At first look, it appeared as if the false-choice 
argument and the balanced approach were two separate positions. As it turns out, the 
complementary nature of the two cannot be avoided: the false choice reflects this 
school’s underlying views, while the balancing act is how to resolve security and liberty 
interests. The core elements of the false-choice position are that both liberty and security 
are important, the two do not necessarily contradict each other, and the state can and must 
protect both.19  With these ground rules set, the challenge becomes how to balance 
security and liberty interests against a threat that brings the battle-space to the domestic 
front.20   
16 Richards, “Intelligence Dilemma?” 764.  
17 Patrick Henry, “A Chronology of U.S. Historical Documents: Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death,” 
University of Oklahoma, accessed September 16, 2013, http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/henry.shtml. 
18 Treverton, Intelligence for Age of Terror, 252. 
19 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 395; Bruce Berkowitz, “Policies and Procedures for Protecting 
Security and Liberty,” in Protecting What Matters: Technology, Security, and Liberty since 9/11, 83; 
Gilman Louie and Gayle von Eckartsberg,  “Security and Liberty: How Technology Can Bridge the 
Divide,” in Protecting What Matters: Technology, Security, and Liberty since 9/11, 63,72; Solove, Nothing 
to Hide, 2,3 4–35,210; Cohen and Wells, American National Security and Civil Liberties, 1; Loch K. 
Johnson and James J. Wirtz, Intelligence and National Security: The Secret World of Spies, ed. Loch K. 
Johnson and James J. Wirtz, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University, 2008), 344–45. 
20 Berkowitz, “Policies and Procedures for Protecting Security and Liberty,” 74–75, 77. 
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 The balanced approach is a process that applies a tradeoff or weighted comparison 
of each side’s interests that produces a desirable outcome.21  Its process relies on the 
threat and effectiveness of an intelligence tool to measure the national security interests 
and the harm to privacy to determine the civil liberty costs. That there is a relationship 
between threat, effectiveness, and privacy is widely recognized. The concept of a 
desirable balance, however, is drastically skewed because of incomplete mechanisms for 
weighing each side, which creates the ambiguity that permits biases of security 
overruling liberty or vice versa.22  One of the main reasons for the problems in the 
balanced approach is the lack of methods for measuring privacy costs.   
C.  IMPORTANCE   
Balancing national security interests and civil liberties has long been a concern in 
the United States.23  The notion of a balance or tradeoff between the two sides, however, 
is inaccurate. While there are ways to measure the threat level as well as the effectiveness 
of a particular intelligence method, there is a noticeably absent value for the privacy costs 
against which those are to be weighed. For example, one could attempt to measure the 
terrorist threat by arguing that statistically, an American has a 1 in 3.5 million chance of 
dying in a terrorist attack every year.24  Experts such as John Mueller contend this 
measurement indicates that terrorism presents less of a threat than many other concerns in 
society. Alternatively, an argument could be made that between 9/11 and September 
2012, there was an average of one terrorist attack disrupted every two and a half months 
21 Cohen and Wells, American National Security and Civil Liberties, viii; Clayton Northouse, 
“Providing Security and Protecting Liberty,” in Protecting What Matters: Technology, Security, and 
Liberty since 9/11, 4,8–9; Schneier, Beyond Fear, 3; Richards, “Intelligence Dilemma?” 763–64; Solove, 
Nothing to Hide, 207; Treverton, Intelligence for Age of Terror, 241; Rosati, “At Odds with One Another,” 
24–25; Garrett Hatch, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: New Independent Agency Status, CRS 
Report RL34385 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, August 27, 
2012), 1, 6; Berkowitz, “Policies and Procedures for Protecting Security and Liberty,” 83.  
22 Westin claims that all positions are about either security or liberty first; all other positions are 
nuances of one of the two; Westin, “How Public Sees Security-versus-Liberty Debate,” 19. 
23 Rosati, “At Odds with One Another,” 11–12; Susan J. Tabrizi, “At What Price?  Security, Civil 
Liberties, and Public Opinion in the Age of Terrorism,” in American National Security and Civil Liberties 
in an Era of Terrorism, 185–86. 
24 John Mueller and Mark G. Steward, “Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally About Terrorism,” 
Foreign Affairs, April 2, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-
stewart/hardly-existential. 
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 within the United States.25  This supports a different measurement—one of a persistent 
and serious threat. Determining which of these approaches is the most appropriate is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the point is that we at least have ways of measuring 
the threat.   
Measuring effectiveness is also possible, such as through demonstrating a 
correlation or causation between an intelligence tool and the disruption of terrorist 
activities. NSA Director General Keith Alexander and FBI Deputy Director Sean Joyce 
justified the necessity of the NSA’s domestic surveillance tools by applying this rationale 
during their testimony to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI). Both Alexander and Joyce credited the surveillance programs with preventing 
more than 50 terrorist events, including 10 targeting the United States and a specific 
threat against the New York Stock Exchange.26  Others, however, claim the NSA tools 
hardly contributed anything to the prevention of those plots and to no more than 7.5 
percent of all disrupted terrorist activities within the United States since 9/11.27  
Irrespective of the value, there are methods by which we can measure the effectiveness of 
various domestic surveillance tools.   
On the other side of the scale, however, there is no generally accepted 
measurement for the civil-liberty costs incurred by domestic intelligence programs. This 
makes it impossible to determine where the balance between security and liberty lies and 
whether it needs adjusted. The political response to the 2013 disclosures of domestic 
surveillance programs demonstrates the negative effects of an incomplete balancing 
25 Jessica Zuckerman, “Fifty-Third Terror Plot Foiled Since 9/11: Bombing Targets U.S. Financial 
Hub,” Heritage Foundation, Issue Brief 3758 (2012), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/terror-plot-foiled-in-new-york-bombing-targets-us-
financial-hub. 
26 Patricia Zengerle and Tabassum Zakaria, “NSA Head, Lawmakers Defend Surveillance Programs,” 
Reuters, June, 18, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/us-usa-security-
idUSBRE95H15O20130618; Patricia Zengerle, “FBI Official Says NSA Programs Helped Foil NYSE 
Bombing Plot,” Reuters, June 18, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/us-usa-security-nyse-
idUSBRE95H0QT20130618. 
27 Peter Bergen et. al., “Do NSA’s Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?” New America 




                                                 
 framework. Arguments against the NSA’s activities by civil-liberties advocates 
progressed under the assumption that intelligence surveillance has crept too far into civil 
liberties, and therefore the government must reform its surveillance programs and 
processes.28  Advocates for the programs argued that the NSA surveillance efforts 
actually impose little, if any, harm to civil liberties. Neither side made a convincing case 
because neither side could provide specific assessments regarding privacy costs. 
Consequently, as more revelations about government surveillance capabilities emerged, 
the pressure grew and tipped the balance in favor of privacy interests. In January 2014, 
intelligence reforms were announced by the White House. In essence, our inability to 
measure the civil-liberty side of the scale has inclined the nation to alter current practices 
based on a perception that there is an unacceptable level of encroachment simply because 
surveillance occurs.   
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES   
A fundamental problem this thesis must address is how to determine which 
factors are relevant to measuring privacy costs. Comparing Cold War-era domestic 
intelligence violations with those of modern programs could provide valuable insight into 
what the key variables are. For example, out of the one million Americans the FBI kept 
records on between 1960 and 1974, it investigated 500,000 of them it suspected were 
subversives without convicting a single person.29  Americans rejected these FBI practices 
as unacceptable. Similarly, privacy concerns led Congress to defund the Pentagon’s Total 
Information Awareness (TIA) program in 2003, which would have collated all 
information about a person from government records as well as every private transaction 
a person conducts.30  These two cases serve as examples of domestic intelligence that 
28 Kristina Peterson and Siobhan Hughes, “Disclosures on NSA’s Surveillance Embolden Its Critics in 
Congress,” Wall Street Journal, August 24, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323665504579029362415300556.html. 
29 George Santayana, “History Repeated: The Dangers of Domestic Spying by Federal Law 
Enforcement,” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed September 12, 2013, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/asset_upload_file893_29902.pdf. 
30 Northouse, “Providing Security and Protecting Liberty,” 3–4. 
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 Americans viewed as too costly to their privacy; the reasons why could inform what to 
look for in other programs.   
Another problem is that societal developments challenge traditional 
interpretations of privacy. This is extremely important to the discussion because without 
a valid privacy interest, there are grounds to argue that there is no privacy cost. 
Moreover, a measurement of privacy costs would be incomplete without integrating all 
areas of legitimate privacy interests. It is therefore necessary to establish what is a valid 
privacy interest. In support of this end, it might be useful to explore the amount of 
personal information Americans freely provide, to whom, how often, and what private 
details it reveals. For example, major telecommunications companies in the United States 
collect data on the location of a person’s phone, incoming and outgoing calls and 
messages, and Internet use and, depending on the company, store the information from a 
period of one year to indefinitely.31  Is society more willing to permit the access and use 
of this information to a company in order to receive a service than to allow the 
government access and use of the same information in order to provide security?  
Analyzing the role of technology in today’s society compared with the intent of Fourth 
Amendment protections could help establish a standard of American privacy against 
which to assess the extent of domestic surveillance tools.   
This thesis hypothesizes that two primary issues translate into privacy costs. First 
is the expectation Americans have for government behavior, such as abusive use of 
surveillance powers or how well the government safeguards personal information in 
order to minimize privacy concerns. Second is the expectation Americans have for 
privacy, at both the individual and societal level.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES  
The first task will be to determine what expectations Americans have for 
government behavior by conducting historical comparison and analysis of domestic 
31 David Kravets, “Which Telecoms Store Your Data the Longest? Secret Memo Tells All,” Wired, 
September 28, 2011, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/cellular-customer-data/; “Fact Sheet 2b: 
Privacy in the Age of the Smartphone,” Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, accessed September 13, 2013, 
https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2b-cellprivacy.htm. 
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 surveillances programs that society rejected as unacceptable. This section will primarily 
rely on Congressional hearings and reports, Inspector General (IG) reports, and 
information the government released about surveillance programs. The result of this 
process will be to capture the lessons learned from failed domestic surveillance 
experiences, identify what the major factors are for scrutinizing privacy concerns and 
safeguards, and then determine how these fit into a model for measuring privacy costs of 
other domestic intelligence programs.   
The second task will be to establish what expectations Americans have for their 
privacy. To reach this conclusion the thesis will rely on the comparison between two 
competing indicators: the historical standards for the expectation of privacy and the 
modernization of society. Sources for this section will be Supreme Court case law, 
statistics about American’s use of technology, and examples of how the nature of 
information is becoming more personal. This section will conclude with new standards 
for what constitute a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy, which will be 
applied to the model for measuring privacy costs.  
Once the expectations for government behavior and privacy are established, the 
lessons from both will be turned into a model for measuring privacy costs. This model 
will then be applied to a current intelligence program, which will rely on declassified 
government documents, public statements made by politicians and intelligence leaders, 
and new intelligence policy directives. 
F. OVERVIEW 
In Chapter II, the thesis turns to the expectations Americans have for government 
behavior in domestic intelligence by examining the experiences of Cold War-era and TIA 
programs. Chapter III will address the expectations Americans have for privacy. Chapter 
IV will provide a model for measuring privacy costs based on the lessons and conclusions 
of Chapter II and Chapter III. In Chapter V, the NSA’s bulk metadata collection program 
under Section 215 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act) will be tested 
against this model. It will also review 2014 intelligence reforms to evaluate what effect, if 
 9 
 any, these reforms had on the privacy costs associated with the NSA program. Chapter VI 
will conclude with suggestions for ways forward, to include which programs the United 
States might need to reevaluate in order to strike an accurate balance with the security 
interest of the state. 
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 II. EXPECTATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR 
Privacy violations come in the form of government activities against its citizens. 
It is therefore instructive to review government programs that society rejected as having 
too high of privacy costs. These discontinued surveillance programs expose the core 
elements that society deems unacceptable government behavior because of the associated 
infringements on privacy. What follows are analyses of CIA, FBI, and NSA surveillance 
activities from the 1940s through 1970s, and the Total Information Awareness initiative 
of the early 2000s. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the capabilities and privacy 
implications of the various programs, which will inform the Chapter IV discussion on 
how to measure privacy costs.  
A. COLD WAR PROGRAMS 
On January 27, 1975, the U.S. Senate established a special committee to 
investigate public allegations of widespread misconduct by the intelligence community 
(IC).32  The mandate of the Church Committee was broad and included the following:  
• determine what activities the intelligence agencies conducted,  
• what activities these agencies should conduct,  
• whether those activities conformed to the law and Constitution, 
• if the existing laws were inadequate to protect the rights of citizens, and 
• how to improve oversight of the different intelligence agencies.33   
In order to accomplish its objectives, the Committee focused on the authorities, 
organization, and activities of the CIA, NSA, FBI, the intelligence components of the 
Department of Defense, and the National Security Council.34  By the time it concluded in 
May 1976, the Church Committee had detailed the intelligence agencies’ expansive 
32 Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 
Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans: Final Report, Book II, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at v (1976); 
“Church Committee Created,” U.S. Senate, accessed March 2, 2014, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Church_Committee_Created.htm. 
33 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at vi (1976).  
34 Ibid., at vii.  
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 violations of constitutionally protected rights. These CIA, NSA, and FBI programs stand 
as examples of unendurable infringements on privacy. 
1. Capabilities 
The apparent partition between the intelligence programs and agencies during the 
1940s and 1970s is deceiving. While the CIA, NSA, and FBI oversaw their own 
activities, they also shared intelligence with other offices in their organizations and with 
each other. Frequently the intelligence sharing went beyond what was legally permissible 
and extended into coordinated domestic surveillance. In order to understand the full 
scope of the privacy infringements, it is necessary to evaluate each program individually 
while also considering the capabilities it provided to the overall domestic intelligence 
apparatus.  
a. CIA: CHAOS 
Starting around August 1967 and ending in March 1974, the CHAOS program 
was an intelligence operation ran by the CIA to determine if the Soviets, Chinese 
Communists, and Cubans were exploiting domestic protests within the United States as a 
means to conduct espionage and subversion.35  The program originally focused on the 
potential foreign communist control of the anti-Vietnam War and the Black Power 
movements. Despite evidence indicating the absence of any significant foreign influence 
in these movements, CHAOS broadened in scope.36  One of the main reasons for 
expanding the program, according to former Director of the CIA Richard Helms, was that 
in order for the CIA to accurately conclude there was no significant foreign influence, it 
had to prove the negative: it needed to investigate all the anti-war protestors and their 
contacts to ensure no association existed between them and foreign powers.37  This 
defective rationale, however, was not the only reason why the CHAOS program 
broadened to other domestic protestors. The White House initiated the program through 
persistent requests to the CIA and then was skeptical of the results, consequently creating 
35 Ibid., at 100.  
36 Ibid., at 96. 
37 Ibid., at 101–02. 
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 pressure to expand its scope.38  In addition, the FBI submitted intelligence requirements 
to CHAOS for its own questionable domestic surveillance purposes, which also 
contributed to stretching the limits of the program’s reach. The FBI started submitting 
names of U.S. citizens to the CIA for monitoring in 1970. Its sole justification for 
conducting surveillance on these people was an accusation that they engaged in domestic 
protests and violence.39  
b. CIA: Mail Opening Program  
Several CIA programs opened mail transiting through, to, or from the United 
States between 1953 and 1973.40 The purpose was to discover Soviet Union intelligence 
efforts within the United States. An Inspector General (IG) report provided to the Church 
Committee during the hearings explained that from its office at the mail processing center 
at LaGuardia Airport in New York City, the CIA screened and photographed a high 
volume of letters, from which it selected a smaller number to steam open, copy, reseal, 
and place back into the mail system. Much like CHAOS, these mail opening programs 
broadened beyond the original purpose. Starting in 1969, the FBI submitted names of 
domestic political radicals and black militants for the CIA to include in its mail opening 
programs. By 1972, the FBI’s request list expanded to include protest and peace 
organizations, such as the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice, the National Peace 
Action Committee, and the Women’s Strike for Peace as well as subversive groups such 
as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalists and Liberation Groups, 
Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, and Revolutionary Union.41   
38 Ibid., at 100–101. 
39 Ibid., at 100. 
40 The FBI also had a mail-opening program but terminated it in 1966, at which point it started 
submitting requirements to, and receiving the benefits from, the CIA programs.  Ibid., at 12, 31, 59,107.  
41 Ibid., 6,58,107–08; Intelligence Activities: Hearing on Mail Opening, Before the Select Comm. to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. (October 21–24, 1975), 
176. 
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 c. NSA: MINARET  
In 1962, the NSA started collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT) on American 
citizens, which the government then used for domestic law enforcement purposes.42  That 
program was MINARET. It was originally limited to people traveling to Cuba, but after 
the Warren Commission’s report on the assassination of President Kennedy the Secret 
Service asked the NSA to monitor communications of people who were potential threats 
to the president.43 Ever since this initial request the MINARET watch list primarily 
focused on Americans.44  Expanding the program, however, involved more than the NSA 
and Secret Service. Throughout the 1960s, the MINARET watch list grew in response to 
FBI requests to include people suspected of narcotics related activity and domestic 
terrorism.45  Not until 1973, in the immediate aftermath of the congressional hearings on 
Watergate, did the attorney general shutdown the MINARET program.46 
d. NSA: SHAMROCK 
From 1947 until 1975, at least three international cable companies provided the 
NSA with millions of private cables sent by Americans.47  The program expanded to 
include essentially all the cables to or from the United States sent or received by the three 
major communications companies.48  Couriers from these companies routinely 
transported the messages to NSA, who would then select cables for additional analysis 
and destroy the rest.49  The broadening of SHAMROCK, however, was more than an 
increase in collection; it also reflected a breakdown of the rules in place that prohibited 
domestic collection by the NSA.   
42 Thomas R. Johnson, Book III: Retrenchment and Reform, 1972-1980, vol. 5, NSA Period: 1952-
Present of a series on American Cryptography during the Cold War, 1945-1989 (National Security Agency, 
1998), 84. 
43 Ibid., 84.  
44 Ibid., 84. 
45 Ibid., 85.  
46 Ibid., 86. 
47 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 6, 12, 104 (1976).  
48 Ibid., at 104. 
49 Johnson, Retrenchment and Reform, 84.  
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 e. FBI: Counterintelligence Program 
The FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) was designed to disrupt 
groups and neutralize individuals that it designated as threats to domestic security. The 
program originally targeted the Communist Party, U.S.A., but its focus gradually shifted 
toward domestic dissenters. Under COINTELPRO, the FBI collected and disseminated 
excessive information on people it labeled as rabble rousers, agitators, key activists, and 
key black extremists and then used covert action to disrupt or neutralize their influence. 
For example, the FBI anonymously attacked the political beliefs of Americans as a means 
of provoking their employer to fire them. In deliberate attempts to destroy marriages, the 
FBI mailed anonymous letters to the spouses of the people it was trying to neutralize. In 
some cases, the FBI prompted the IRS to investigate Americans as a form of harassment 
and to delegitimize protest leaders. Finally, targets of COINTELPRO would be 
physically attacked by or expelled from their group as a direct result of the FBI falsely 
and anonymously labeling them as government informants.50 
f. FBI: Communist Infiltration 
Similar to COINTELPRO and CHAOS, the Communist Infiltration (COMINFIL) 
program originally focused on communist influence of domestic activists. The Church 
Committee found that the FBI exaggerated the extent of domestic communist influence 
by foreign powers. Consequently, COMINFIL expanded into the FBI’s broadest 
intelligence collection program. It collected a wide range of information on political, 
legislative, and cultural activities, youth, women’s, farmers’, and veterans’ matters, and a 
person’s religion and education. In effect, the COMINFIL program provided intelligence 
on a wide range of groups that did not have any significant connections to communists.51  
g. FBI: Watch Lists 
A key contributor to domestic intelligence abuses was the FBI’s use of watch 
lists. The FBI’s priority arrest list, known as DETCOM, contained the names of key 
50 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 10,63,69,89 (1976). 
51 Ibid., at 48,68.  
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 figure and functionaries of the Communist Party.52  Similarly, the Communist Sabotage 
(COMSAB) list contained names of potential communist saboteurs.53  There was also the 
Communist Index, which although its name implied a focus on key communists within 
the United States was actually much broader. The Communist Index contained people of 
interest to internal security irrespective of any communist connections.54  Another 
important list maintained by the FBI was the Rabble Rouser Index. According to the 
FBI’s definition, a rabble-rouser was “a person who tries to arouse people to violent 
action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, et cetera.”55  In 1967, the Rabble 
Rouser definition expanded to include “persons with a ‘propensity for fomenting’ any 
disorders affecting the ‘internal security’” of the United States.56  The FBI renamed it the 
Agitator Index in 1968 and applied an even lower standard for what constituted an 
agitator, consequently deflating the list’s value.57   
A new initiative replaced the Agitator Index: it was known as the Key Activist 
program.58  Key activists, as defined by the FBI, were: “individuals in the Students for 
Democratic Society and the anti-Vietnam war groups [who] are extremely active and 
most vocal in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for civil 
disobedience and other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts.”59  A domestic authority 
with law enforcement power categorizing civil disobedience as unlawful is antithetical to 
freedom and a precursor for privacy violations. Individuals on the Key Activist list were 
subject to technical and physical surveillance despite not being suspected of committing 
or planning to commit a federal crime.60 
52 Ibid., at 55. 
53 Ibid., at 55.  
54 Ibid., at 55. 
55 Ibid., at 90. 
56 Ibid., at 90. 
57 Ibid., at 90. 
58 Ibid., at 90. 
59 Ibid., at 90. 
60 Ibid., at 90. 
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 The FBI abolished the Agitator Index in 1971 because the Agency was already 
conducting surveillance on those people under the decades old Security Index. The FBI 
and Department of Justice (DOJ) created the Security Index as part of an emergency 
action plan; if a significantly disruptive event occurred that threatened the effective 
operation of national, state, or local governments or of national defense, the FBI would 
immediately detain the individuals on this list without warrant. The Church Committed 
found that to place someone on the Security Index, the FBI required no more than a 
“reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will 
conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage and sabotage, including acts of 
terrorism or assassination”61—or any other act that could create a significant disruptive 
event. Despite the FBI tightening the Security Index’s standards and reducing its size in 
1955, those names taken off were simply placed on the Communist Index. In 1960, the 
FBI renamed the Communist Index the Reserve Index and expanded it to include 
professors, teachers, labor union organizers, newsmen, lawyers, doctors, and scientists. 
The Reserve Index served as a list of people who would receive priority consideration for 
action by the FBI after it detained those listed on the Security Index.62  
2. Privacy Implications 
Every program detailed above expanded beyond its original mission to include, if 
not exclusively focus on, domestic intelligence. Two major components of the privacy 
costs weighed against these programs were the number of Americans affected and the 
low intelligence value. For example, by the time the CIA terminated CHAOS its 
surveillance had included radical students, African-American expatriates, and U.S. 
persons that traveled to certain overseas locations.63  More concretely, through CHAOS 
operations the CIA had indexed information on over 300,000 people and groups and 
created 13,000 files that included more than 7,200 files on Americans and over 100 on 
domestic groups.64  The Committee concluded that the program’s collection was 
61 Ibid., at 92. 
62 Ibid., at 54–56,69,89,91–92. 
63 Ibid., at 100. 
64 Ibid., at 6,102. 
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 excessive and that much of the information was irrelevant to legitimate intelligence and 
government interests.65 
In the end, the Committee’s report found that the CIA mail-opening program 
produced a computerized index of nearly 1,500,000 names. The Senate hearings on mail 
opening revealed that during the span of these operations, 28,322,796 letters were subject 
to screening, of which the CIA photographed 2,705,726 envelopes, copied 389,324 
envelopes, and copied the contents of 215,820 letters it had opened. During the hearings, 
the Church Committee struggled to find a single case of these operations resulting in the 
identification of a foreign agent. In addition, internal IC reports scrutinized at the 
hearings showed that the information was only occasionally helpful, a meager source of 
intelligence, and of very little value. The Church Committee report concluded that the 
CIA intercepted communications of various types of domestic dissidents through the mail 
opening programs that was unrelated to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
purposes.66   
The NSA’s MINARET and SHAMROCK programs received similar criticisms. 
The Church Committee found it difficult to attribute any meaningful intelligence value to 
MINARET.67  For example, the NSA intercepted, disseminated, and stored 
communications that were mostly of a private or personal nature, such as peace 
protestors, anti-war activists, journalists, and a spouse of a U.S. senator, or about rallies 
and demonstrations that were already public knowledge.68  While the 1,600 names on the 
MINARET watch list was small compared to the scope of other programs, the collection 
was still quite substantial.69  The Committee did not reveal as many specifics about the 
NSA programs as it did for the others. What is likely is that SHAMROCK essentially 
operated as a collection method for acquiring SIGINT on Americans on the MINARET 
watch list. Under the SHAMROCK program, the NSA selected approximately 150,000 
65 Ibid., at 102. 
66 Ibid., 6,59,108; Hearing on Mail Opening, 1–2,6,31,168. 
67 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 108 (1976). 
68 Ibid., at 108–09. 
69 Johnson, Retrenchment and Reform, 85.   
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 messages per month for additional analysis.70  Being that the MINARET list was 
composed of mostly Americans, the overall effect was the NSA monitoring a pervasive 
amount of citizens’ private communications. 
The various FBI programs resulted in widespread surveillance of Americans. 
Between 1960 and 1974, of the over 500,000 separate investigations of subversive 
persons or groups, not a single person or group was prosecuted under the relevant laws 
that prohibit overthrowing the government—the very legal basis used to conduct these 
investigations.71  Prosecutions based on other laws were also scarce. For example, only 
1.3 percent of the 17,528 domestic intelligence investigations by the FBI in 1974 resulted 
in prosecution and conviction.72  Moreover, the 500,000 number represents only the 
investigations carried out by headquarters and does not include those conducted by the 
FBI field offices, which maintained a larger number of investigative files.73  Not only 
were the total investigations likely much higher, but so was the number of people 
affected. Domestic intelligence files contained information on more than one person or 
group.74  The Church Committee found that hundreds or thousands of group members or 
associates could be included in a single file.75  
Another major component of the privacy costs associated with these programs 
was the breakdown between foreign intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement. 
The Committee specifically noted how the CIA programs violated the ban on foreign 
intelligence agencies from conducting internal security, as well as violating statues that 
protect mail privacy and prohibit the interception of communications.76  The NSA 
bypassed several similar restrictions, such as those establishing that it only collect foreign 
intelligence and monitor only foreign communications, but not communications between 
70 Ibid., 84. 
71 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 19 (1976). 
72 Ibid., at 19. 
73 Ibid., at 6,47. 
74 Ibid., at 6. 
75 Ibid.,  at 47. 
76 Ibid., at 12,58–59.  
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 persons within the United States or concerning purely domestic affairs.77  Regardless of 
these rules, the NSA conducted domestic intelligence. Not only were the CIA and NSA 
programs almost exclusively providing intelligence for domestic law enforcement 
purposes, but many of the investigations they supported were illegitimate. For example, 
the FBI, the main provider of names to the watch lists, used the NSA to collect SIGINT 
on domestic terrorists, foreign radical suspects, journalists, civil rights leaders, and 
politicians such as high profile targets Art Buchwald, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Frank 
Church.78  All of these programs intentionally neglected privacy protections for 
American citizens. The CIA, NSA, and FBI collectively eroded the institutional design to 
separate foreign and domestic intelligence as a means of protecting American’s against 
intrusive government power.79  These effects provided much of the impetus behind 
Senator Church’s push for legislative changes to insure intelligence abuses would not 
occur again.80  
The final major privacy concern raised by these intelligence programs was the 
blatant disregard for constitutional protections. The widespread privacy infringements 
violated the constitutional rights of Americans engaged in lawful activity.81  As the 
record shows, these domestic intelligence activities did not focus on collecting evidence 
for criminal investigations but instead became a process of conducting illegal 
surveillance and secret activities against American citizens.82  People were targeted by 
the government for First Amendment protected activities such as political expression and 
lawful assembly.83  Government surveillance and intimidation both infringed on privacy 
and deterred citizens from exercising their First Amendment rights.84  
77 Ibid., at 69,104. 
78 Johnson, Retrenchment and Reform, 85.  
79 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 104 (1976). 
80 Johnson, Retrenchment and Reform, 94–95.  
81 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 1,15 (1976). 
82 Ibid., at 10,63,86. 
83 Ibid., at 1,10,17,20,68. 
84 Ibid., at 1,10,17,20. 
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 The widespread abuses by the intelligence agencies resulted in the overhaul of 
executive, congressional, and judicial intelligence oversight. In the summer of 1975, 
President Gerald Ford implemented mechanisms to better supervise CIA activities, 
restricted CIA’s domestic activities, banned mail opening, and ended the abusive 
wiretaps and use of tax information.85  President Ford also issued Executive Order 11905 
in February 1976, which established an Intelligence Oversight Board within the 
Executive Office of the President.86  Congress followed suit. The Senate created the 
Select Committee on Intelligence in May of 1976 and the House of Representatives 
established the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in July of 1977.87  Congress 
empowered both Committees with oversight of the IC and the power to authorize 
expenditures for intelligence activities.88  Another key change was the 1978 Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that put strict legal conditions on the IC’s use of 
electronic surveillance and established the FISA Court (FISC) as the approving authority 
for such surveillance.89  Finally, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 established the 
criteria for intelligence reporting to the oversight committees, which included disclosing 
covert actions and the loose standard of keeping the committees fully and currently 
informed.90  All of these reforms produced the cumulative effect of placing the IC 
“within the constitutional scheme for controlling government power”91 and created an 
overlay of oversight bodies focused on better protecting civil liberties.92   
B. TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS 
In 2002, the Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA), an organization 
within the Department of Defense (DOD), announced it was developing new intelligence 
85 “The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community-An Historical Overview,” Federation of 
American Scientists, accessed March 2, 2014 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid.; Johnson, Retrenchment and Reform, 108.  
88 “Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Federation of American Scientists. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 S. Rep. No. 94-755, at iii (1976). 
92 Johnson, Retrenchment and Reform, 108–09. 
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 technologies under its TIA initiative.93  In September 2003, the program ended after 
suffering public, media, and Congressional backlash.94  At the core of the TIA 
controversy was its improper balance between security and privacy. The TIA experience 
thus provides an example of a national security program that ended due to unacceptable 
privacy costs.   
1. Capabilities 
Immediately following 9/11, national leaders focused on the need to break down 
the barriers between IC partners, increase intelligence sharing, and improve the ability of 
the IC to connect disparate fragments of intelligence. The TIA program, as envisioned, 
was the theoretical answer to these problems. The goal of TIA was to create a 
counterterrorism information architecture that would: increase access to and sharing of 
information, thereby increasing how much total information was available and could be 
evaluated; provide automatic warnings of dangerous or suspicious activity after a trigger 
event occurred; cue analysts about peoples’ activities that match terrorist behavioral 
patterns; enable hypothesis testing of theories and mitigation strategies related to future 
terrorist activities.95  Increasing access, sharing, and coverage of information were 
technical solutions to having data and analysts dispersed throughout the world. Trigger 
events and behavioral patterns were also technical solutions in which computers would 
have analyzed vast amounts of transactional and behavioral data and then provide 
warnings of suspicious activity.   
Procedurally, TIA would have started with a red team developing different 
terrorist attack scenarios against the United States, determine what planning and 
preparation activities these attacks require, create a list of expected transactions that 
93 John Markoff, “Pentagon Plans a Computer System that Would Peek at Personal Data of 
Americans,” New York Times, November 9, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/09/politics/09COMP.html. 
94 H.R. Rep. No. 108-283, at H8772 (September 24, 2003) (Conf. Rep.). 
95 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Report to Congress regarding the 
Terrorism Information Awareness Program, May 20, 2003, 3–4.  Note that the name changed from Total 
Information Awareness to Terrorism Information Awareness.  These two names are interchangeable and 
refer to the same program, according to H.R. Rep. No. 108-283, at H8772 (September 24, 2003) (Conf. 
Rep.). 
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 would fit these models, and analyze what behavioral patterns a terrorist would likely 
follow for a given attack scenario.96  For such a program to work, however, would have 
required intelligence analysts to have access to a considerable amount of data not only on 
known or suspected terrorists, but also on everyone else. In order to differentiate between 
the average person, the person who is neither average nor a terrorist, and the terrorist 
required monitoring the activities of everyone. Distinguishing the terrorists and their 
activities from the general population required a set of tools, which were the new 
technologies DARPA planned to develop as subprograms of TIA.97  The technologies 
with the most notable privacy concerns were Genisys, Evidence Extraction and Link 
Discovery, Scalable Social Network Analysis, MisInformation Detection, Human 
Identification at a Distance, Activity, Recognition and Monitoring, and Next-Generation 
Face Recognition.98   
a. Genisys 
The purpose of the Genisys program was to develop the technology necessary to 
integrate databases and other information sources. At the time, the available technology 
was too complex, inflexible, slow, and error prone; making integrating or creating 
databases on a scale required by the IC extremely difficult to achieve. By developing a 
federated database architecture, Genisys would have enabled analysts to access, use, and 
evaluate more information. The program would have integrated data related to “all 
potential terrorists and possible supporters; terrorist materials; training, preparation, and 
rehearsal activities; potential targets; specific plans; and the status of [U.S.] defenses.”99  
Genisys was a program designed to connect the dots for an IC that was heavily criticized 
for failing to do so before 9/11; it would have done this by developing groundbreaking 
ways of accessing and sharing unprecedented amounts of information at as close to real 
time as possible.100 
96 DARPA, Report to Congress, 3, 6, 18–31. 
97 Ibid., 3. 
98 Ibid., 31. 
99 Ibid., A-10. 
100 Ibid., 5–6,A-10. 
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 b. Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery 
The technologies DARPA slated for development under the Evidence Extraction 
and Link Discovery (EELD) program would have taken unstructured textual data from 
sources ranging from intelligence to news reports and automatically extract information 
about relationships between people, organizations, and places. Its anticipated intelligence 
value would have been to minimize the analysis of legitimate activities and focus instead 
on those the system automatically flagged as suspicious. The automated analysis of 
various sources could have potentially discovered new threats from unknown individuals 
or groups. Conceptually, it would have automatically found the dots, decided which dots 
to connect, and connected them.101  
c. Scalable Social Network Analysis  
The objective of Scalable Social Network Analysis (SSNA) was to improve social 
network analysis capabilities by identifying normal patterns of behavior, patterns that 
match the behavior of terrorist groups, and changes in a terrorist network that indicate an 
impending attack.102  The intelligence value of this program was basic, but important: in 
order to defeat a terrorist network, intelligence must first detect and define that network. 
It would have required essentially the same type of information as the EELD program—
namely, information that defined or explained the relationships between people, 
organizations, and places. The SSNA program would have included information that 
characterizes the type of interactions between people, the nature of the interaction, and 
the different roles people have in a social network.103 
d. MisInformation Detection  
The focus of the MisInformation Detection (MInDet) program was to determine 
the intelligence reliability of publicly available sources and identify intentional 
misinformation efforts against the IC.104  While this would have had a general 
101 Ibid., 7–8. 
102 Ibid., 9. 
103 Ibid., A-16. 
104 Ibid., 9. 
 24 
                                                 
 intelligence value in the form of vetting open sources, another application of the program 
could have provided a much more specific counterterrorism value. Based on the premise 
that terrorists and their supporters would intentionally try to hide information about 
themselves and their activities, the proposal for MInDet envisioned the potential for the 
program to detect deceptive information on government forms and in textual documents, 
which could then prompt a more thorough investigation into the person’s activities.105     
e. Human Identification at a Distance 
The purpose of Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID) was to advance 
biometric technologies “with the capability to detect, recognize, and identify humans at a 
distance.”106  In essence, the program would have monitored people near government 
facilities with video, infrared imagery, and multispectral sensors, collect their biometric 
signatures, uniquely identify them, and presumably provide a reliable assessment on 
whether or not a person was threatening. DARPA described the intelligence value of this 
program as providing critical early warning against human-based threats, such as 
terrorism.107 
f. Activity, Recognition and Monitoring 
Where HumanID focused on the individual biometrics, Activity, Recognition and 
Monitoring (ARM) sought to develop technologies to capture, identify, and classify 
different types of human activities in a surveillance environment.108  The intelligence 
value of this program would have been to differentiate normal and suspicious human 
behaviors in a given area or situation and then provide a warning when it detected 
questionable behavior. For example, it potentially could have identified unattended 
packages at a public event or terrorists casing a critical infrastructure target.109  The 
ARM program would have relied on similar sources as HumanID, to include video, agile 
105 Ibid., 9. 
106 Ibid., 10. 
107 Ibid., 10–11. 
108 Ibid., 11. 
109 Ibid., A-21. 
 25 
                                                 
 sensors, low power radar, infrared sensors, and radio frequency tags.110  An implied 
capability was the ability to monitor the routine behavior of average citizens in order to 
develop the baseline human activity models on which this relies. Additionally, the ARM 
program also implied constant surveillance in public places, as the collection 
technologies would feed the automated warning components of the system. 
g. Next-Generation Face Recognition 
 The Next-Generation Face Recognition (NGFR) program pursued development 
of new facial biometrics collection and analysis tools. After developing the technology, 
NGFR would have been able to automatically and confidently identify known or 
suspected individuals detected by a web of sensors. Implied in this program would have 
been its integration with the HumanID and ARM surveillance sensors against which to 
run the facial recognition technology. An additional major component of the NGFR 
program would have been to create a large database of facial imagery.111 
h. Composite Capabilities of the Total Information Awareness Program 
Taking all of the subprograms into account, two characteristics of TIA stand out. 
First, there was a robust virtual surveillance component. Genisys would have established 
the information network that provided access to incomparable amounts of data on 
terrorists, criminals, and law abiding American citizens. The EELD program would have 
then used Genisys’ database infrastructure to sift through the treasure trove of 
information and automatically decipher links between people, places, and organizations. 
In essence, it would automatically build the social network of whomever the analyst 
queries. Applying the SSNA program would better refine that person’s network and use 
automated tools to determine if that person’s social network is legitimate or resembles a 
terrorist group. Finally, although the MInDet program is not directly connected to the 
chain of virtual surveillance, automatically scrutinizing government documents and 
publicly available information could provide the impetus for starting an investigation into 
110 Ibid., 11. 
111 Ibid., 12. 
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 someone’s behavior by indicating to the EELD or SSNA programs that this person’s 
activity is questionable.   
Second, TIA included robust physical surveillance capabilities. Common to both 
HumanID and NGFR would have been the ability of the government to use a distributed 
web of complex sensors across numerous facilities and public environments to uniquely 
identify people. In order for these programs to work, each would have to communicate 
with a database of personally identifiable biometric data in order to establish an identity. 
In addition, the ARM program would have provided the capability to flag suspicious 
activity detected on the same network by comparing a person’s behavior with models of 
what it considered suspicious. Yet to do this required substantial surveillance of routine, 
law-abiding behavior in order to establish a baseline of non-threatening behavior. Such 
were the proposed virtual and physical capabilities of TIA; the privacy implications were 
many. 
2. Privacy Implications 
Criticisms of TIA included accusing DARPA of creating a dragnet, Big Brother 
spying program against Americans that was outside of congressional oversight and 
lacked sufficient safeguards, constitutional protections, clear accountability, and privacy 
related guidelines.112  These claims had merit, but so did DARPA’s defense of TIA. The 
program was in the developmental stage and under an agency whose focus was to create 
the new technologies required to fill intelligence capability gaps. Since TIA was a 
conceptual research and development program, DARPA argued there were practical 
reasons why robust privacy mechanisms were not yet built into the system. This is not to 
say that DARPA ignored the privacy concerns raised by TIA. On the contrary, DARPA 
repeatedly addressed the privacy implications in its description of TIA subprograms and 
was developing the Genisys Privacy Protection program as part of TIA.113  Nevertheless, 
112 Ron Wyden, “Wyden Calls for Congressional Oversight, Accountability of Total Information 
Awareness Office,” news release, January 15, 2003, http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases; 
Timothy J. Burger, “A Terror Tracking System by Any Other Name,” TIME, May 14, 2003, 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,451925,00.html; Markoff, “Pentagon Plans a Computer 
System that Would Peek at Personal Data of Americans.” 
113 DARPA, Report to Congress, 3,6,18–31. 
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 the reservations associated with TIA were so substantial that Congress defunded the 
program. 
From DARPA’s perspective, the principal concerns raised by TIA came from the 
programs with data access, data search, and pattern recognition capabilities—namely, 
Genisys, EELD, SSNA, MInDet, HumanID, ARM, and NGFR. The core privacy issues 
with HumanID, ARM, and NGFR related to program effectiveness and accuracy, where 
and when the technologies would be deployed, and if the programs would analyze stored 
surveillance of public places. These concerns, however, were secondary to those created 
by the Genisys, EELD, SSNA, and MInDet data search and analysis tools, which focused 
on the type of information stored in the programs’ databases.114   
In addition to program specific implications, DARPA also identified broad level 
privacy concerns. Chief among these were access to sensitive personal information, 
access to aggregate personal information, storing personal information, unauthorized 
access to or use of the sensitive information, and accuracy of the personal information.115  
The level of attention given to privacy concerns and DARPA’s plan for addressing them 
reflects that the agency was serious about creating protections in tandem with the other 
technologies. Its development of tools to limit searches to legally authorized results, 
provide an automated audit trail of searches and record retrieval, and make the data 
anonymous demonstrated this commitment.116  These tools were part of a program called 
Genisys Privacy Protection, which would have also been part of TIA.117  
A Department of Defense IG report conducted in response to a request from 
Senators Chuck Grassley, Bill Nelson, and Chuck Hagel offers another perspective on the 
privacy implications of TIA. The IG report identified two significant privacy concerns 
with TIA not addressed in DARPA’s analysis. First, DARPA did not conduct a privacy 
impact assessment (PIA). DARPA defended the choice not to conduct a PIA based on its 
use of artificial data and legally obtained intelligence; this type of information did not 
114 Ibid., 3,31. 
115 Ibid., 29–30. 
116 Ibid., 33–34. 
117 Ibid., 6–7,A-12–13. 
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 require an assessment.118  While the IG conceded that DARPA’s argument was 
technically correct, it nonetheless concluded that “in the case of TIA, prudence would 
dictate that a requirement for a privacy impact assessment be done as a best business 
practice.”119  The IG’s argument focused on three core points: when aggregated, the 
information would have been used for purposes other than the original intent; 
development of TIA technologies occurred simultaneously with its transition to 
operational status; TIA would have been used for domestic law enforcement purposes.120  
The use of artificial data was irrelevant because the intelligence technologies were 
shifting into operational status, after which hypothetical privacy issues shifted to actual 
privacy violations. The other significant privacy issue addressed by the IG was the use of 
Department of Defense assets for domestic purposes: “the use of TIA by law enforcement 
is what has caused the greatest public concern over privacy.”121  The fear was that TIA 
created a substantial increase in government power precisely in the section of government 
with law enforcement authority; the program was primed for abuse and misuse.122   
One noteworthy privacy concern brought up in public criticism of TIA was the 
nature of the information. Allegations of Big Brother, dragnet surveillance came out of 
TIA’s scope of collection as well as the type of information it would use. Identifying 
patterns of behavior, monitoring for automatic triggers of suspicious behavior, and 
similar activities mentioned in the capabilities section above require substantial collection 
of and access to transactional data. The types of data that DARPA would have used under 
TIA were financial records, educational documents and information, travel activities, 
medical records, transportation history, housing information, email and telephone 
118 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Terrorism Information Awareness 
Program, D-2004-033, December 12, 2003, 4–6. 
119 Ibid., ii,4–6,14.   
120 Ibid., 6,11. 
121 Ibid., 7. 
122 Ibid., 4. 
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 records, credit card purchases, and countless government records.123  Access to these 
transactional records would have resulted in making available to intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies commercial and government records on a colossal scale. Permitting 
the executive branch to collect and access this personal information creates a 
considerable privacy infringement. Although DARPA argued that TIA would not include 
dossiers on U.S. citizens nor maintain a single grand database of all U.S. transactions,124 
such a technical distinction was immaterial. DARPA recognized that TIA would have 
eliminated the virtual obscurity of having personal data spread throughout different 
sources and formats through providing almost instantaneous access to all these data.125  
Rapid access to various sources of sensitive personal information would have achieved 
the same functional purpose of dossiers but in the form of search results, and of a grand 
database but in the form of broad access to multiple databases. It is therefore necessary to 
factor in privacy concerns derived from what information reveals about a person when 
aggregated with numerous sources. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Cold War era CIA, NSA, and FBI intelligence activities as well as the post-
9/11 TIA subprograms represented unacceptable infringements on privacy. Society, as 
the stakeholder in privacy interests, rejected certain government behavior as having too 
high of a cost. It is not to say that every national security program must have the 
expressed approval of the people, but it is to say that some things are unacceptable. 
Measuring privacy costs therefore requires applying these lessons by avoiding the 
unacceptable costs and working toward the threshold of what is acceptable. More of this 
123 “Total Information Awareness (TIA) System,” DARPA, last updated November 25, 2002, 
http://www.darpa.mil/iao/TIASystems.htm (site discontinued, a screenshot is available at 
http://epic.org/events/tia_briefing/tia_screenshot.gif); “TIA Categories,” DARPA, last updated November 
25, 2002, http://www.darpa.mil/iao/TIASystems.htm (site discontinued, a screenshot is available at 
http://epic.org/events/tia_briefing/tia_categories.gif); Gene Healy, “Beware of Total Information 
Awareness,” CATO, January 20, 2003, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/beware-total-
information-awareness; Jeffrey Rosen, “Total Information Awareness,” New York Times, December 15, 
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/15/magazine/15TOTA.html; Markoff, “Pentagon Plans a 
Computer System that Would Peek at Personal Data of Americans.” 
124 DARPA, Report to Congress, A-6. 
125 Ibid., 33. 
 30 
                                                 
 will be addressed in Chapter IV. What suffices at this point is to recognize that there are 
historically founded characteristics of inappropriate government behavior. Before 
discerning the boundaries on privacy costs, it is first necessary to address the second 
primary factor of measuring privacy costs: the expectation of privacy. Whereas society’s 
standards temper government action, the government’s interest in protecting society 
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 III. EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
The thesis now turns to the second of the two primary issues that affect privacy 
costs: an expectation of privacy. One way to assess privacy costs is to ascertain if a 
person has a valid privacy interest and determine if a surveillance program infringes on 
that interest. This interest is commonly referred to as an expectation of privacy, which is 
based on a person exhibiting a subjective expectation of privacy and society’s willingness 
to accept that expectation as reasonable.126  Interpretations of what satisfies these two 
standards are rooted in Supreme Court cases from the 1970s and have become outdated. 
The changing information landscape requires a shift in the subjective and reasonable 
standards of privacy in order to fully account for the privacy costs of modern surveillance 
programs. This chapter will demonstrate that there is an increase in personal information 
available to surveillance programs, which brings with it significant privacy implications. 
It will conduct a brief analysis of the subjective and reasonable standards of the 
expectations of privacy followed by an argument for how the pervasiveness of 
technology in modern society challenges traditional interpretations of these two 
conditions. The chapter will conclude by offering new standards for evaluating a 
subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy that will result in a more accurate 
assessment of privacy costs. 
A. SUBJECTIVE AND REASONABLE PRIVACY STANDARDS 
The Supreme Court developed the expectation of privacy standards as a way to 
gauge if a person has a Fourth Amendment privacy interest that protects him or her 
against unwarranted domestic surveillance. Starting in Katz versus United States, the 
Court applied a twofold test to ascertain if a person has a valid privacy interest: “first that 
a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”127  A 
subjective expectation hinges on what actions a person takes to exhibit his or her intent to 
126 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
127 Ibid. 
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 maintain privacy, such as the things a person keeps to him or herself. In his concurring 
opinion in Katz, Justice John Marshall Harlan II argued that a person must demonstrate 
an intention to keep objects, activities, or statements to himself in order to claim an 
expectation of privacy.128  Similarly, Justice Byron White argued that the intent to 
preserve privacy is reflected by a person’s efforts to exclude the uninvited ear.129  While 
these actions certainly demonstrate a person’s intent to keep something private, the effect 
is to substitute secrecy for privacy. Both justices Harlan and White maintained that 
sharing information negates a subjective expectation of privacy.130  This interpretation of 
what constitutes a subjective expectation of privacy contradicts the fundamental purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment. Constitutional privacy safeguards are designed to protect a 
person against government inference in his or her life,131 which entails substantially 
different considerations than the burdensome requirement that everyone must keep 
everything secret. Put a different way, it is not that a person has a right to keep things 
secret; it is that he or she is free from unwarranted government intrusion. The problem 
with demanding secrecy in order to maintain a privacy interest is it erodes privacy 
protections by setting an infeasible requirement, thereby giving the government access to 
information that it can argue does not raise privacy costs because there is no legitimate 
privacy interest.   
A valid privacy interest requires not just a person exhibiting a subjective 
expectation of privacy, but society must recognize it as reasonable. The most influential 
interpretation of what society will accept as a reasonable expectation of privacy is known 
as the third party doctrine. The doctrine was established in the cases Smith versus 
Maryland and United States versus Miller, in which the Supreme Court held that society 
rejects an expectation of privacy when a person voluntarily provides information to a 
third party. The two premises of the Court’s conclusion were that voluntarily providing 






                                                 
 person providing the information accepts the risk that it will be given to the 
government.132  One problem with this opinion is it builds upon the flawed understanding 
of privacy as secrecy by granting the government unfettered access to any information a 
person divulges. Another problem is it undermines basic freedoms because it establishes 
that a person must isolate herself from modern society in order to maintain her privacy 
interest. In a free society, however, providing information to another party during routine 
societal interactions is not the same as a person consenting to government access to that 
information.133  In the words of Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Smith: “privacy 
is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose 
certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume 
that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”134  It is 
unreasonable for society to align its standards of privacy with a paranoid expectation that 
the other party will provide any and all information to the government. The traditional 
application of the reasonable standard results in the categorical rejection of valid privacy 
interests for information provided to third parties, which unduly decreases privacy costs 
associated with government surveillance. 
While this thesis agrees in principle with the subjective and reasonable 
requirements of privacy, it disagrees with the traditional interpretations and applications 
explained above. The strict, burdensome criteria extend the threshold for establishing a 
valid a privacy interest beyond what is feasible in modern society. The pervasiveness of 
technology in America today presents new challenges to what is a subjective and 
reasonable expectation of privacy. In United States versus Jones, Justice Samuel Alito 
noted that as technology progresses, there will not always be clear analogies between the 
twenty-first and eighteenth centuries.135  The role of various technologies in routine 
societal interactions is such a situation, and it requires a new way of interpreting what 
constitute subjective and reasonable expectations of privacy.   
132 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
133 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
134 Smith, 442 U.S. 735. 
135 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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 B. THE PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY 
a. More Internet Usage 
The reach of technology into nearly every part of the American way of life and 
the amount of records kept by both people and organizations has important privacy 
implications. Some of the most basic social interactions, such as working, banking, 
shopping, commuting, and communicating, now have a cyber element.  Recent statistics 
put the amount of Americans with Internet access at 86 percent of the population.136  The 
level of use alone reflects the pervasiveness of the Internet in society. When the types of 
online activities are taken into account, the role of technology in the performance of 
routine social interactions becomes apparent (Table 1). 
136“Internet User Demographics,” Pew Research Center, accessed February 8, 2014, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/internet-use/latest-stats/; Center for the Digital Future, The 2013 




                                                 
  
Table 1.   U.S. Internet Usage137 
b. More Participants and Data 
Most of the traditional ways of carrying out social interactions included just two 
parties. For example, purchasing a book used to be between a person and a bookstore, 
buying an airline ticket between a person and an airline, and banking between a person 
and the bank. Conducting these activities over the Internet, however, increases the 
number of participants for any given exchange. A routine interaction would now 
reasonably include the person, the Internet service provider, a search engine, the 
company that builds or maintains the website, and the company or organization with 
whom the person intends to interact. These participants may keep records on the person 
and his or her activity. Thus, with the increase in participants in ordinary transactions has 
also come an increase in data creation. An estimated 98 percent of stored information was 
digital as of 2013 and technological improvements have simultaneously amplified 
137 “Trend Data (Adults),” Pew Research Center, accessed February 8, 2014, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Online-Activites-Total.aspx; “Pew Internet: Health,” 
Susannah Fox, Pew Research Center, December 16, 2013, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Commentary/2011/November/Pew-Internet-Health.aspx; Center for the Digital 
Future, The 2013 Digital Future Report, 16. 
Have Used the Internet To: Percentage of 
Internet Users
Find information through a search engine 91
Send or receive email 88
Search a map or get driving directions 84
Read the news 78
Research health information 72




Make travel reservations or purchases 65
Purchase books 63
Read political news or information 61
Conduct online banking 61
Look for religious information 32
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 information access, storage, sharing, and analysis capabilities.138  Traditional 
interpretations of the subjective and reasonable expectations of privacy deny that a person 
has a valid privacy interest in any of these interactions or any of the information.   
There are also the hidden, less known participants that constantly track online 
activity. Data brokers surreptitiously collect and aggregate data pertaining to a person’s 
online activity, which they then use to create detailed dossiers about him or her.139  
Companies like Acxiom, Epsilon, Reed Elsevier, and Datalogix each maintain data on 
millions of Americans.140  One of the primary methods these companies use to track a 
person’s behavior is through websites, but tracking can also occur through mobile 
devices.141  This tracking occurs mostly unknown because it requires no deliberate 
consent by the user, the technology is embedded in the websites, and it uses the unique 
identifiers associated with a person’s device.142  When someone uses the Internet to read 
the news, make travel reservations, and do online banking, his or her activity is tracked 
across multiple websites. For example, the Doubleclick tracking tool monitors users’ 
behavior on websites belonging to Bank of America, Delta airlines, Enterprise and Hertz 
rental car, Hilton hotel, CNN, Fox News, and the Washington Post.143  Similarly, 
Omniture tracks activity on Bank of America, Citi Bank, JP Morgan, Budget rental car, 
138 U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Office of Oversight and 
Investigations, A Review of the Data Broker Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale of Consumer Data for 
Marketing Purposes, December 18, 2013, 1. 
139 Ibid., i,5,36. 
140 Ibid., 10,12. 
141 Ibid., 10,31. 
142 Ibid., 4,31. 
143 Bank of America homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, https://www.bankofamerica.com/; Delta 
homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.delta.com/; Enterprise homepage, accessed February 7, 
2014, http://www.enterprise.com/car_rental/home.do; Hertz homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, 
https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/reservation/; Hilton homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, 
http://www3.hilton.com/en/index.html; CNN homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/; 
Fox News homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/; Washington Post homepage, 
accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/. 
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 Marriott hotel, BBC News, Fox News, and the Washington Post.144  The companies that 
own these trackers partner together and share the information collected.145  Thus, even if 
a specific tool such as Omniture does not track a user’s activity across all websites, 
partnership significantly increase its access to information. The associated business 
records about a person’s activities would be outside of the traditional application of the 
reasonable privacy expectation of privacy standard, even though a person did not 
voluntarily provide this information.  
c. More Personal 
The information in business records that pertain to online activity can be highly 
personal. Today, these records reveal a significant amount of private details, such as a 
person’s habits, preferences, and financial and health status.146  By tracking routine 
activities, companies are able to paint an accurate profile of the user. Bluekai, for 
example, claims: “place our pixel on any page to analyze incoming traffic [and] discover 
the precise aggregate profile of any site visitor.”147  Although this statement seems more 
ambition than reality, the amount of data that each of the hundreds of companies track 
and the level of sharing that occurs through partnerships makes the precise profiling of 
users feasible. Acxiom’s consumer profiles demonstrate this point. Acxiom requires a 
user to enter his first and last name, full address, date of birth, last four digits of his social 
security number, and an email address in order to see some of the information it has on 
144 Bank of America homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, https://www.bankofamerica.com/; Citi 
Bank homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, https://online.citibank.com/US/Welcome.c; J.P. Morgan 
homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan; Budget homepage, 
accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.budget.com/budgetWeb/home/home.ex; Marriott homepage, 
accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.marriott.com/default.mi; BBC News, accessed February 7, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/; Fox News homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/; 
Washington Post homepage, accessed February 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/. 
145 “Partners,” Foresee, accessed on March 1, 2014, http://www.foresee.com/company/partners.shtml; 
“Webtrends Partners,” Webtrends, accessed on March 1, 2014, https://webtrends.com/partners/webtrends-
partners; “Partner Program,” Bluekai, accessed on March 1, 2014, http://bluekai.com/customers.php; 
“Technology Partners,” Brightcove, accessed on March 1, 2014, 
http://www.brightcove.com/en/partners/technology-partners.  
146 Senate Committee on Commerce, A Review of the Data Broker Industry, i,2.  
147 Bluekai, “Little Blue Book: A Buyer’s Guide,” Bluekai, February 2014, 5, 
http://bluekai.com/bluebook/bluekai-little-blue-book.pdf. 
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 him.148  The requirement to use personally identifiable information in order to see part of 
a digital dossier makes it evident that the tracking is precise; it is personal.   
Two examples demonstrate what even limited data points reveal about a person. 
One of those sources of information is social network sites. WolframAlpha provides a 
detailed analysis about a person’s life simply by accessing the metadata associated with 
his or her Facebook account. Its Personal Analytics product will calculate a user’s 
activity patterns, to include when a person is active for a given day of the week, what he 
or she is doing, such as posting photos or making comments, and if the connection occurs 
through a mobile device.149  It will also diagram the social structure of a person’s friends 
(Figure 1), identify who among them plays a special role, and provide a geographic 
layout of where those friends are in the world (Figure 2).150 
 
Figure 1.  WolframAlpha Social Network Structure Analysis151  
148 “Who Are you?,” Acxiom, accessed on March 1, 2014, https://aboutthedata.com/portal. 
149 “Personal Analytics for Facebook,” WolframAlpha, accessed on March 1, 2014, 
http://www.wolframalpha.com/facebook/. 
150 Ibid.  
151 Figure taken from “Personal Analytics for Facebook,” WolframAlpha, 
http://www.wolframalpha.com/facebook/. 
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Figure 2.  WolframAlpha Friend Location Analysis152  
Another source that has few details but still reveals significant personal 
information is email metadata. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
Immersion tool analyzes a person’s social network based solely on the metadata in his or 
her emails—the From, To, CC, and timestamp.153  Based on the analysis of these simple 
data points, Immersion will show who a person communicates with most, the social 
network links between the contacts, how far back the communication history goes 
(Figure 3).154 
152 Figure taken from “Personal Analytics for Facebook,” WolframAlpha, 
http://www.wolframalpha.com/facebook/. 
153 “Immersion: A People-Centric View of Your Email Life,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), accessed on March 1, 2014, https://immersion.media.mit.edu.   
154 “Will Hunting” [Demo], MIT, accessed on March 1, 2014, https://immersion.media.mit.edu/demo. 
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Figure 3.  MIT Immersion Email Analysis155 
Combining the social network and email analysis tools would reveal even more 
personal information, let alone adding sources of travel, banking, and phone records or 
sources that track online activity. Providing the government unrestrained access to 
personal information is extremely worrisome from a privacy perspective, yet that is 
exactly what results from traditional interpretations of the subjective and reasonable 
expectations of privacy. Thus, even if the government does not collect this data on 
Americans or create dossiers, it can access commercial equivalents without a warrant. 
C. CONCLUSION 
One way to identify privacy costs is to assess the presence of a legitimate privacy 
interest. Establishing that such an interest exists relies on the two Fourth Amendment 
privacy standards: a subjective expectation by the individual and society’s willingness to 
recognize that expectation as reasonable. This chapter argued that the traditional 
interpretations of these two standards have been insufficient, particularly in the context of 
routine interaction in modern society. The role of technology in society presents a 
significant challenge because traditional interpretations would authorize government 
access to a wealth of personal information derived from routine social interactions and 
that reveals extremely private details. The Fourth Amendment protects a person’s privacy 
155 Figure taken from “Will Hunting” [Demo], MIT, https://immersion.media.mit.edu/demo. 
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 from government incursion, but allowing the government free access to this information 
is in and of itself an incursion. The Court has challenged the traditional interpretations 
precisely for this reason. While addressing the privacy implications of the third party 
doctrine in modern society, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued: 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they 
dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the 
email addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to 
online retailers. . . . I for one doubt that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every 
website they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever 
the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status 
only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose 
is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.156 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to ensure the same level of privacy protections 
for Americans throughout time.157  In order to do this, there needs to be updated 
standards of the subjective and reasonable expectations of privacy. 
A proper understanding of these two criteria is crucially important because it can 
skew the balance between privacy and security: if privacy standards are too strict, it will 
undervalue privacy costs while if the standards are too loose, then it will overvalue 
privacy costs. This thesis interprets the subjective and reasonable standards to mean the 
following. First, a person exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy by deliberately 
limiting the value and quantity of the objects, activities, or statements he or she shares 
with others and by restricting the number of people with whom he or she shares these 
things. Second, a reasonable expectation of privacy accounts for the pervasiveness of 
technology in society, particularly in regards to conducting routine social behaviors, 
surreptitious collection of personal information, and the level of detail in business 
records. These standards better capture a person’s expectation of privacy, which makes 
156 Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
157 Ibid. 
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 the overall privacy interest more reflective of actual concerns over privacy infringements. 
With these two fundamental components of the expectation of privacy established, the 




 IV. HOW TO MEASURE PRIVACY COSTS 
The analysis in the previous chapters established the elements of privacy costs. 
Chapter II demonstrated how aspects of intelligence programs that defy Americans’ 
expectations for government behavior can create privacy concerns. Chapter III delineated 
standards for a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy against which 
government activities cannot infringe without generating privacy concerns. Taken as a 
whole, the factors identified in both chapters provide the basis for measuring privacy 
costs. This chapter will turn those elements into a model for measuring the overall 
privacy costs of an intelligence program. The two principal components of this model are 
the primary and comprehensive assessments. 
A. PRIMARY ASSESSMENT  
Measuring privacy costs of an intelligence program starts with an analysis of the 
core privacy elements identified in the previous chapters. This examination first 
determines whether these elements apply to an intelligence program. Next, it evaluates 
what effect the presence or absence of that element has on privacy costs. For example, if 
an intelligence program collects personal information, then there is a legitimate privacy 
concern, which increases the privacy costs. Some factors decrease the overall cost by 
accounting for privacy concerns or protecting against abuse. If an intelligence program 
applies technology that makes information anonymous, for example, then it minimizes 
the possibility of the government abusing that personal information. On the other hand, 
the absence of mitigating tools or procedures increases privacy costs. For instance, if 
limiting the number of analysts who can access sources of personal information lessens 
the potential for abuse by intelligence agencies, then the absence of this feature increases 
the possibility for abuse and thus raises the associated privacy cost.   
The Privacy Concerns and Safeguards Matrix in Figure 4 is the tool for 
conducting the primary assessment. As shown in the matrix, privacy cost elements fall 
into two categories: those that establish privacy concerns and those that act as privacy 
safeguards. Each factor increases or decreases privacy costs according to the following 
 45 
 general rules. The presence of privacy concerns or the absence of safeguards increases 
privacy costs. If a program has safeguards, then privacy costs decrease. The absence of a 
privacy concern neither increases nor decreases costs. For example, a primary assessment 
of the Cold War FBI programs reviewed in Chapter II would result in the matrix in 
Figure 5. The comprehensive analysis provides meaning to these costs 
 
Figure 4.  Privacy Concerns and Safeguards Matrix 
 
Privacy Concerns Yes or No Privacy Safeguards Yes or No
Program collects or accesses personal 
information:
Yes: Supports valid privacy interest and 
increased privacy cost
Parties responsible conducted a privacy 
impact assessment:
Yes = Mitigates privacy concerns and 
decreases privacy cost
Information collected or accessed is 
being used for other than intended 
purpose:
No: Does not support the presence of a 
valid privacy interest
Sharing of intelligence products derived 
from personal information is limited:
No = Increases privacy concerns and 
increases privacy cost
Information falls under a subjective 
expectation of privacy:
Access to personal information is 
restricted:
Society recognizes the expectation of 
privacy as reasonable:
Program is subject to Executive 
oversight:
Information collected or accessed is 
derived from activities protected under 
the First Amendment:
Program is subject to Congressional 
oversight:
Program is subject to Judicial oversight:
Accountability mechanisms enable the 
auditing of access to and use of personal 
information:




Figure 5.  FBI Cold War Programs158 
B. COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT   
The objective of comprehensive assessment is to capture the overall costs 
associated with an intelligence program in order to inform the debate between security 
and liberty. It attempts to answer the questions: what are the privacy costs and are these 
costs acceptable?  Based on the results of the primary assessment, the comprehensive 
analysis contextualizes the overall concerns raised by a program, identifies any 
deficiencies in the program, and assesses what has the most negative effect on the overall 
privacy costs. For example, if the intelligence program’s only source of information 
derives from First Amendment protected activities, there are no other privacy concerns 
implicated, and all the safeguards are in place except for Congressional and Judicial 
oversight the comprehensive assessment would be as follows. In this example, the overall 
concerns are related to the privacy factors with the most negative effect: the Executive 
branch would be unchecked by other branches of the government while it infringed on 
the privacy of Americans participating in free speech, religion, or political expression. 
The significant shortfall would be the lack of Congressional and Judicial oversight. The 
158  This figure uses the information about FBI surveillance programs detailed in Chapter II. 
FBI Cold War Programs
Privacy Concerns Yes or No Privacy Safeguards Yes or No
Program collects or accesses personal 
information:
Yes Parties responsible conducted a privacy 
impact assessment:
No
Information collected or accessed is 
being used for other than intended 
purpose:
Yes Sharing of intelligence products derived 
from personal information is limited:
No
Information falls under a subjective 
expectation of privacy:
Yes Access to personal information is 
restricted:
No
Society recognizes the expectation of 
privacy as reasonable:
Yes Program is subject to Executive 
oversight:
Yes
Information collected or accessed is 
derived from activities protected under 
the First Amendment:
Yes Program is subject to Congressional 
oversight:
No
Program is subject to Judicial oversight: No
Accountability mechanisms enable the 
auditing of access to and use of personal 
information:
No
The information is made anonymous: No
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 comprehensive assessment provides this level of analysis to the overall privacy costs 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.  Example Comprehensive Assessment 
Acceptability, the second element that the comprehensive analysis addresses, is 
not a normative judgment about the ultimate costs associated with an intelligence 
program. Instead, it is a subjective representation of the public’s tolerance for intelligence 
tools, lack of safeguards, or the reach of a program. Acceptability contextualizes a 
program’s privacy concerns by indicating which concerns are higher priorities or where 
the scope of the program falls in relation to public tolerance. Determining a subjective 
acceptance level requires comparing the scope of the intelligence program—measured in 
both the number of total people affected and the number of Americans affected—with 
public opinion. For example, the TIA program would have had unlimited access to credit 
card transactions, which would have affected every American with a credit card at the 
time.159  Would the government collecting and accessing data on the credit card 
transactions of over 159 million Americans160 have been within the threshold of public 
tolerance in 2002?  According to public opinion in 2002, 43 percent of Americans 
approved of the government accessing credit card records.161  The percentage of 
Americans that would have been affected, however, would have been higher than the 
percentage of those who approved (Figure 7). Consequently, the scope of the program 
159  The TIA capabilities are detailed in Chapter II. 
160 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
2012 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), table 1188. 
161 “Balancing Act: National Security and Civil Liberties in Post-9/11 Era,” Carroll Doherty, Pew 
Research Center, June 7, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/balancing-act-national-
security-and-civil-liberties-in-post-911-era/. 
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 would have been subjectively unacceptable, thus increasing the privacy costs. Although 
public opinion is not an authoritative gauge for the acceptability of an intelligence 
program, it nonetheless puts the concerns into context—which either subjectively 
increases or decreases the privacy costs.  
 
Figure 7.  Example of Acceptability Analysis162 
C. CONCLUSION 
Measuring privacy costs requires a primary analysis that determines whether a 
certain privacy concern applies to an intelligence program and then assesses a positive or 
negative privacy cost. The comprehensive assessment builds off the primary evaluation 
and determines what the overall costs are for a given program. This requires an 
examination of the cumulative results of the primary analysis to identify the overall 
concerns raised by a program, its shortfalls, and which areas have the most negative 
effects on the program’s privacy costs. The comprehensive assessment also addresses the 
acceptability of the privacy concerns, which puts the overall costs into context.   
There are limitations to measuring privacy costs. Alternative options such as a 
scoring system would be insufficient because measuring privacy costs is not amenable to 
162 Ibid.; Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, table 1188; Bureau of the Census, Population 
Estimates: Annual Resident Population Estimates of the United States by Age and Sex (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2002).  
100% collection surpasses 
subjective acceptability threshold 
Subjectively acceptable threshold 
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 quantitative analysis. Assigning numerical values to privacy concerns runs the risk of 
devaluing legitimate privacy interests. That an American has a subjective and reasonable 
expectation of privacy is just as valid of an interest as the right to participate in First 
Amendment protected activities free from government surveillance. One concern should 
not be valued more than the other; the real value is simply that a privacy concern exists. 
Moreover, safeguards can minimize risks, but these cannot negate the presence of a 
legitimate privacy concern. That an analyst does not know to whom the information 
pertains because it is anonymous does not annul the privacy concern created by the 
government collecting personal information. The purpose of measuring privacy costs is to 
inform what is at stake; it is not the role of arbitrary numbers to determine what is a high, 
low, or worthwhile privacy cost. That decision is left to society as it balances between 
security and liberty.  
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 D. PRIVACY COSTS ASSESSEMENT FORM 
 
Figure 8.  Privacy Costs Assessment Form  
  
Privacy Concerns Yes or No Privacy Safeguards Yes or No
Program collects or accesses personal 
information:
Yes: Supports valid privacy interest and 
increased privacy cost
Parties responsible conducted a privacy 
impact assessment:
Yes = Mitigates privacy concerns and 
decreases privacy cost
Information collected or accessed is 
being used for other than intended 
purpose:
No: Does not support the presence of a 
valid privacy interest
Sharing of intelligence products derived 
from personal information is limited:
No = Increases privacy concerns and 
increases privacy cost
Information falls under a subjective 
expectation of privacy:
Access to personal information is 
restricted:
Society recognizes the expectation of 
privacy as reasonable:
Program is subject to Executive 
oversight:
Information collected or accessed is 
derived from activities protected under 
the First Amendment:
Program is subject to Congressional 
oversight:
Program is subject to Judicial oversight:
Accountability mechanisms enable the 
auditing of access to and use of personal 
information:
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 V. MEASURING PRIVACY COSTS OF A MODERN 
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 
One of the most controversial domestic surveillance programs in modern times is 
an NSA program that collects business record (BR) metadata in bulk under Section 215 
authorities of the Patriot Act.163  A vast majority of these records pertains to 
communications of U.S. persons within the United States.164  The NSA BR metadata 
program has consequently received heavy criticism for infringing on Americans’ privacy, 
which has generated numerous calls for reform by some members of Congress and the 
public. On the other side of the issue are people who argue that the program is an 
effective counterterrorism tool. The debate is essentially between security and liberty, but 
that conversation is uninformed until those involved know what the privacy costs are. 
This chapter will take the method for measuring privacy costs outlined in Chapter IV and 
apply it to the NSA BR metadata program. A majority of the chapter will focus on the 
primary and comprehensive assessments of the overall privacy costs. It will conclude 
with an evaluation of recent changes to intelligence practices and determine what effect 
these reforms will have on the privacy costs associated with the BR metadata program.   
A. PRIMARY ASSESSMENT 
1. Privacy Concerns 
This section will measure the privacy concerns of the BR metadata program in 
accordance with the method established in Chapter IV. Specifically, it will determine if 
the program uses information for other than its originally intended purpose, uses personal 
information, infringes on an expectation of privacy, or targets First Amendment protected 
activities. 
163 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence, National Security Division (NSD), Report on 
the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs Affected by USA PATRIOT Reauthorization, 
February 2, 2011,1; NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs Affected by 
USA PATRIOT Reauthorization, December 14, 2009, 3. 
164 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), Supplemental Opinion and Order, Docket 
Number: BR 09-15, November 5, 2009, 5. 
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 a. Using Information for Another Purpose 
 The first question to answer is: does the NSA BR program use information for 
something other than the original purpose of that information?  Under the BR program, 
the NSA collects bulk metadata from U.S. telecommunications providers.165  It obtain 
this information from telecommunications companies by providing a court order that 
requires them to produce business records on nearly all the telephone calls each one 
handles both in and out of the country as well as calls made entirely within the United 
States.166  It then uses this information to conduct call chaining, which is a form of 
intelligence analysis.167  Thus, the program takes information from telecommunication 
companies originally intended for the limited purposes of establishing a contractual 
relationship and maintaining billing records and uses it to analyze a person’s 
communication habits and contacts. The BR program clearly uses metadata for a purpose 
other than those the companies and customers originally intended. 
b. Personal Information  
The second question to answer is: does the NSA BR program collect or access 
personal information?  This question is difficult to answer. On the one hand, the data is 
intentionally stripped of personal information. It does not collect the content of 
communications or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber.168  
Instead, the BR program collects the following types of information:169  
• Telephone numbers 
• Times of communication 
• Dates of communication 
165 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 2. 
166 Ibid., 3. 
167 NSD, Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated January 28, 
2009, Docket Number: BR 08-13, February 17, 2009, 3. 
168 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 3,5; NSD, 
Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2011, 5; FISC, Primary Order, 
Docket Number: BR 13-80, April 25, 2013, 3; FISC, Order, Docket Number: BR 06-05, May 24, 2006, 2. 
169 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 3,5;  NSD, 
Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2011, 5; FISC, Primary Order, BR 
13-80, 2013, 3; FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 2. 
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 • Duration of a call 
• International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number 
• International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number 
• Trunk identifier 
• Telephone calling card numbers 
While this data can be quite revealing, without the identifying information it only depicts 
activities of a nonspecific person.   
On the other hand, the NSA analysis of the metadata is supposed to identify 
terrorists. The BR program is misleading in this regard because its purpose is to uncover 
the tactics used by terrorist organizations to disguise and obscure their identities.170  
Thus, if the program is successful, then it can learn these tactics and potentially reverse 
them to identify terrorists. After all, that is what the program is designed to do: “analysis 
of the BR metadata addresses a critical, threshold issue for the Government’s efforts to 
detect and prevent terrorist acts affecting the national security of the United States: 
identifying the terrorists and their associates.”171  This stated objective, however, is how 
the BR program fits into overall counterterrorism efforts. The actual purpose of the BR 
program is to determine if terrorist networks are communicating with anyone inside the 
United States, but the identification process stops at the telephone identifier without 
accessing any personal information.172  Subsequent actions might access personal 
information to identify who is using the telephone that is communicating with terrorists, 
but that is not done by the NSA—it is done by the FBI (more on the NSA and FBI 
coordination will be addressed in the Limited Dissemination part of the Privacy 
Safeguards section). The data collected and accessed under the NSA BR program treads a 
fine line between ambiguous and personal information. Without any identifiable 
information to tie the metadata back to, however, the NSA program does not invoke 
privacy concerns associated with personal information.   
170 FISC, Order, Docket Number: BR 08-13, March 2, 2009, 2. 
171 NSD, Report of the United States, Docket Number: BR 09-09, August 17, 2009, 50. 
172 Ibid., 50–51. 
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 c. Subjective and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Do Americans have a subjective expectation of privacy over their phone records 
and is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?  The Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) General Counsel Robert Litt argued that 
according to the third party doctrine, Americans do not have a legally valid expectation 
of privacy over the BR metadata.173  At the same time, Litt recognized that changing 
technology is influencing privacy interests; Americans are giving away “massive amount 
of information” about themselves.174  An important distinction is that Americans are not 
giving their information to the government. Litt specifically commented on how 
Americans provide their information to private companies but do not want the 
government to have this information.175  According to the subjective and reasonable 
standards applied in this thesis, that point demonstrates intent by the American people to 
restrict the sharing of that information with the government. Thus, a person entering into 
a contract with a telephone company chooses to provide limited information to that 
company and not to the government, thereby exhibiting a subjective expectation of 
privacy. This expectation is also reasonable from a societal perspective because having a 
telephone is part of normal life, communicating is a routine social interaction, phones are 
the technology over which it occurs, and providing information to a company does not 
equate to consent for government surveillance. Americans have an expectation of privacy 
over BR metadata. 
d. First Amendment Protected Activities  
The final question to answer is: does the BR program collect or access 
information created during First Amendment protected activities?  The answer is no. 
While the metadata pertains to communications, which someone could argue is protected 
173 Robert S. Litt, Privacy, Technology and National Security: An Overview of Intelligence 




174 Ibid., 3. 
175 Ibid., 4. 
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 under First Amendment freedom of speech, the program does not collect content.176  
Thus, the protected activity—speech—is not the source of information. Additionally, 
there are forceful restrictions that prevent the BR program from infringing on First 
Amendment protections. For example, the government cannot determine that a U.S. 
person is associated with an international terrorist organization solely based on his or her 
First Amendment activities.177  Collecting the BR metadata must be relevant to an 
authorized investigation,178 and that investigation of potential ties between a U.S. person 
and an international terrorist organization cannot solely be based on First Amendment 
protected activities.179  Thus, even though speech, religion, and political expression fall 
dually within the characteristics of terrorism and First Amendment freedoms, these 
activities are protected. An association with terrorism has to exist in order for the 
government to investigate, collect, and subsequently use the metadata. Consequently, 
there is no First Amendment privacy concern in the NSA BR program. 
2. Privacy Safeguards 
This section will apply the method established in Chapter IV to determine what 
safeguards the BR program institutes to mitigate privacy concerns. It will evaluate the 
following tools and procedures: privacy impact assessment, limitations on dissemination, 
restrictions on access, executive, congressional, and judicial oversight, and mechanisms 
that enable auditing and make the information anonymous. 
a. Privacy Impact Assessment  
There is no indication that the government conducted a PIA for the BR metadata 
program. None of the declassified documents by ODNI have yet to include a PIA.180  
176 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 3,5; NSD, 
Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2011, 5; FISC, Primary Order, BR 
13-80, 2013, 3; FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 2. 
177 FISC, Primary Order, Docket Number: BR 09-13, September 3, 2009, 8. 
178 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 2. 
179 Ibid., 2; FISC, Primary Order, BR 09-13, 2009, 8. 
180 The declassified documents are announced and posted on “Press Releases,” Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases.  As of February 28, 2014, 
there has been no release pertaining to a PIA of the NSA BR metadata program under Section 215 of FISA.  
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 While the evidence is inconclusive, it is likely that the government never conducted a 
PIA because of how the program developed. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, 
President Bush used Executive authority to sanction the collection of telephone metadata, 
which Congress subsequently codified into law.181  Thus, out of emergent circumstances 
the program emerged and then continued to expand to what it is today. 
b. Limited Dissemination 
 One of the most basic privacy safeguards is to limit how much of the metadata is 
shared throughout the intelligence community. The BR program limits dissemination in 
two ways: internally and externally. Only analysts in the NSA trained in specific 
handling, dissemination, and usage guidelines can see BR metadata query results before 
the information is minimized.182  The minimization process governs the collection, 
processing, retention, and dissemination of information about U.S. persons.183  For 
example, instead of using a name, intelligence can use the term U.S. person.184  What this 
means in context to the BR program is that before any of the approved analysts shares the 
intelligence with anyone else, they must first transform some of the data into general 
information that protects against the possibility of anyone determining to whom the 
information refers. For external dissemination, NSA must also minimize the results of 
metadata queries.185  NSA applies such a strict interpretation of minimization it prohibits 
the sharing of the telephone number because someone can use it to identify who the 
person is. The result might be an intelligence report that warns of Al-Qaeda 
communicating with several U.S. persons within the United States at a higher frequency 
than normal without specifying what telephone numbers it is calling. 
181 ODNI, “DNI Announces the Declassification of the Existence of Collection Activities Authorized 




182 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 12–13. 
183 NSA, U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18: Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures, 
revised January 25, 2011, 41–50.  
184 Ibid., 48.  
185 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 13. 
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 Exceptions to the minimization rule can occur if specific criteria are met.186  The 
NSA cannot disseminate un-minimized information about a U.S. person unless it is 
necessary to understand the value of the foreign intelligence, it is evidence of a crime, or 
it “indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm.”187  Yet even in these 
circumstances, the FBI must follow additional minimization procedures for domestic 
operations after it receives the intelligence from NSA.188  These exceptions are also rare. 
Despite collecting a considerable amount of metadata, the NSA only provides an average 
of two telephone numbers per day to the FBI.189  Overall, the most personal information 
shared by the BR program is a very small amount of telephone numbers linked to 
international terrorist organizations. 
c. Restricted Access  
While the BR program collects an immense amount of data, the NSA tightly 
restricts access to the metadata. The only government agency that stores and accesses the 
information is the NSA.190  It restricts access by applying unique markings to the 
metadata so that software can control who queries the data.191  Only those at the NSA 
with authorization and specific training can access the information and only for specific 
purposes.192  First, there must be a reasonable, articulable suspicion (RAS) that the 
telephone number is associated with a terrorist organization on an official government list 
in order for an analyst to query the database.193  Second, a query requires an approved 
telephone number as the search term and only for the purpose of call chain analysis.194  
186 Ibid., 13. 
187 ODNI, Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, June 8, 2013, 2. http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-
releases-2013/871-facts-on-the-collection-of-intelligence-pursuant-to-section-702-of-the-foreign-
intelligence-surveillance-act 
188 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 4; FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 4. 
189 FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 4. 
190 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 4. 
191 Ibid., 4–5. 
192 Ibid., 5: FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 5. 
193 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 4. 
194 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 6–7. 
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 Most of these telephone numbers are on an alert list reviewed and authorized by the 
FISC,195 but a select group of twenty-two officials can approve a number if there is RAS 
that it connects to one of the listed terrorist organization.196  Thus, it is only when an 
approved telephone number is associated with an international terrorist organization that 
one of the few authorized and trained analysts can access BR metadata. As of 2008, the 
FISC limited that number to a mere 85 analysts.197  Access to the data is clearly 
restricted. 
d. Executive Oversight  
The DOJ, ODNI, and NSA mainly handle oversight of the BR program. The 
coordination and reporting requirements for Executive oversight is extensive. As 
mentioned above, the collection of BR metadata occurs by serving a court order to the 
telecommunications companies. That order is generally effective for 90 days. During that 
period, the following types of oversight occur. First, representative from the NSA Office 
of General Council (OGC), Office of the Director of Compliance, and DOJ review the 
program’s compliance with the FISC order and submit their findings in writing to the 
court.198  Second, every 90 days DOJ must review a sample of the queries made against 
the BR metadata.199  Third, every 45 days the OGC reports to the Director on the 
effectiveness of NSA’s oversight of data on U.S. persons.200  Fourth, twice during the 
authorized period of collection the National Security Division (NSD) of DOJ reviews 
both the NSA’s justifications for approving telephone identifiers as well as the queries 
conducted against the BR metadata.201  Every 36 days the NSA must file a report with 
195 Ibid., 9. 
196 Ibid., 7,10. 
197 FISC, Order, BR 08-13, 2009, 9. 
198 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 15; FISC, Primary Order, BR 09-13, 2009, 17. 
199 FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 8. 
200 Ibid., 8. 
201 FISC, Primary Order, BR 09-13, 2009, 16. 
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 the court that accounts for all dissemination of U.S. person data in any form outside the 
NSA that occurred since the last report.202   
An obvious criticism is that since the same branch of government running a secret 
program is also reviewing its compliance with legal requirements, the oversight is likely 
just a rubber stamp. The available record, however, indicates otherwise. For examples, 
when a DOJ and NSA review discovered a compliance issue they immediately informed 
the FISC as well as the intelligence committees in Congress and the Director of NSA 
initiated a comprehensive review of the program.203  The problems generally related to a 
few instances where unauthorized NSA analysts received un-minimized BR metadata 
reports and technical issues that resulted in broad the dissemination of similar 
information.204  The causes of the compliance issues were related to technical errors in 
the software and operator mistakes,205 but these were subsequently remedied. The self-
identification of the compliance problem and immediate reporting of the issues to the 
other oversight bodies demonstrates a persistent Executive oversight program. 
e. Congressional Oversight  
Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) have stated that they were aware of 
the BR program.206  Not only were the committee members aware, but so were other 
members of Congress.207  The Executive branch also claimed to regularly inform 
Congress, which is supported by declassified letters from the DOJ to the SSCI and 
202 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 16. 
203 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 4. 
204 Ibid., 4. 
205 Ibid., 4; NSD, Report of the United States, BR 09-09, 2009, 57. 
206 Parmy Olson, “U.S. Senators: NSA Cellphone Spying Has Gone On 'For Years,’” Forbes, June 6, 
2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2013/06/06/u-s-senators-nsa-cellphone-spying-has-gone-
on-for-years/; Glenn Kessler, “Obama’s Claim that ‘Every Member of Congress’ Was Briefed on 
Telephone Surveillance,” The Fact Checker (blog), Washington Post, June 11, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-claim-that-every-member-of-congress-
was-briefed-on-telephone-surveillance/2013/06/10/fd03ea8e-d21f-11e2-8cbe-1bcbee06f8f8_blog.html; 
Imtiyaz Delawala, “Intelligence Committee Leaders Defend NSA Surveillance,” ABC News, June 9, 2013, 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/06/intelligence-committee-leaders-defend-nsa-surveillance/.  
207 Olson, “U.S. Senators”; Kessler, “Obama’s Claim that ‘Every Member of Congress.’” 
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 HPSCI about the BR metadata program.208  The DOJ also provides annual reports to the 
SSCI and HPSCI on the BR metadata program.209   Moreover, Congress extended the 
powers of the surveillance program under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and 
reauthorized these authorities in 2012.210  While there may have been disagreements 
regarding the BR metadata program, Congress was informed and made decisions that 
affected the program. It conducted oversight. 
f. Judicial Oversight  
The FISC has the authority to determine and enforce the BR metadata program’s 
compliance with its orders and the law.211  At times, this oversight is administrative in 
nature such as when it reviews the NSA, DOJ, and ODNI reports or approves telephone 
numbers that can be used to access the BR metadata.212  Other times, the oversight is 
fierce. For example, although the FISC determined that there were no intentional or bad-
faith violations of its orders during the compliance issues,213 it nonetheless held the NSA 
accountable for the problems. At one point, the FISC ordered the government to complete 
and provide the results of an end-to-end system review of the program, provide an 
affidavit that describes the value of the metadata to national security, demonstrate that the 
metadata are for authorized investigations, submit an affidavit stating that the 
technological remedies have been tested and are successful, and explain additional 
208 NSD, The Attorney General’s Annual Report on Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign 
Intelligence Purposes Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, April 2011; NSD, The Attorney 
General’s Annual Report on Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign Intelligence Purposes Under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, April 2012.  
209 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs 2009, 4; NSD, Report 
on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2011, 4;  ODNI, Facts on the Collection of 
Intelligence, 1–2; ODNI, “DNI Clapper Declassified Intelligence Community Documents Regarding 
Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),” press release, 
September 10, 2013; http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/927-
draft-document. 
210 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Public Law 110-261, 110th Cong., July 10, 2008; FISA 
Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Public Law 112-238, 112th Cong., December 30, 2012. 
211 FISC, Order, BR 08-13, 2009, 14. 
212 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 4; FISC, 
Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 9,15. 
213 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 4. 
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 remedial steps the government will take.214  The court required these steps to restore its 
confidence in the government’s ability to protect information about U.S. persons. Until 
this occurred, the FISC approved BR metadata collection on a case-by-case basis instead 
of the usual bulk method.215  The FISC also ordered the government to explain the 
compliance incidents in full and provide supporting documentation so the court can 
determine if it should modify or rescind the order, direct additional remedial steps, or 
take legal action against the people responsible for the misrepresentations or violations of 
the order.216  These examples demonstrate that not only is there Judicial oversight of the 
BR metadata program, but that role provides an important safeguard against the privacy 
concerns inherent in the program. 
g. Auditing Access to Personal Information 
 Under the BR metadata program, any of the metadata that concerns a U.S. person 
is “subject to strict and frequent audit and reporting requirements.”217  For example, 
every time that an unapproved telephone number is used to query the metadata, a record 
is generated.218  In addition, every time someone accesses the metadata, the system 
automatically creates an auditable record that includes the user’s login identifier, IP 
address from which the request generated, date and time of the query, and the specific 
search request.219  Thus, there is strict auditing of who accesses the metadata and how it 
is used, the results of which are included in the Executive and Judicial oversight 
reports.220 
214 FISC, Order, BR 08-13, 2009,19–20. 
215 Ibid., 12–18; ODNI, “DNI Clapper Declassified Intelligence Community Documents.”  
216 FISC, Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15, 2009, 
Docket Number: BR 08-13, January 28, 2009, 2. 
217 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 2; NSD, Report 
on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2011, 5. 
218 FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 2013, 7. 
219 FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 6; FISC, Primary Order, BR 09-13, 2009, 12. 
220 NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 2; NSD, Report 
on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2011, 5; FISC, Order, Docket Number: BR 
09-06, June 22, 2009, 7. 
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 h. Information Is Anonymous 
 The information is anonymous at collection because of the prohibition on 
collecting names or addresses.221  Additionally, the telephone number is treated as 
personal information and is protected as such. Even if a telephone number belonging to a 
U.S. person is affiliated with an international terrorist organization, that telephone 
number is still treated in accordance with the minimization procedures that protect the 
personal information of U.S. persons.222  The BR metadata is anonymous information. 
B. COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 
The next step in the measuring process contextualizes the overall concerns raised 
by the BR program, identifies any deficiencies in the safeguards, and assesses what has 
the most negative impact on the overall privacy costs. This comprehensive assessment 
will attempt to answer the questions: what are the privacy costs and are these costs 
acceptable?  The overall privacy concern is that the BR metadata program collects 
substantial amounts of data on Americans that falls under an expectation of privacy. 
While there are strong safeguards in place to protect against abuses, the primary shortfall 
is that no PIA was conducted. In order to be most effective, safeguards must address 
anticipated privacy issues. Without a PIA, however, there was insufficient insight into 
what these problems could be and, consequently, many issues that could have possibly 
been addressed at the outset of the program were not. Without a PIA, there is an 
increased chance that privacy problems will arise. The compliance issues with the BR 
metadata program thus far have proven this negative effect to be true. Example problems 
include analysts being able to query the data without a RAS-approved telephone number, 
a software tool could override the limit on how many numbers the call chain analysis 
could search, and the CIA, FBI, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) could 
221NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2009, 3,5; NSD, Report 
on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 2011, 5; FISC, Primary Order, BR 13-80, 
2013, 3; FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 2. 
222 FISC, Primary Order, 13-80, 2013, 13; NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk 
Collection Programs, 2009, 2; NSD, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs, 
2011, 5; FISC, Order, BR 06-05, 2006, 6. 
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 access un-minimized information about U.S. persons.223  A PIA could have potentially 
identified these problem areas and the government could have implemented safeguards 
before the compliance issues occurred.   
A vast majority of the BR metadata the NSA collects is irrelevant to FBI 
investigations yet pertains to the communications of U.S. persons within the United 
States.224  Does this practice fall within the tolerance of the American people?  To assess 
whether or not the program is acceptable requires a comparison of the scope of 
collection, access, and use of the information with public opinion. There is no publicly 
available information on how much of the U.S. person metadata the NSA accesses. There 
is, however, information related to the scope of collection and the use of metadata. 
There is no escaping that the amount of metadata collected under the BR program 
is substantial. As of 2014, the number of American adults with cell phones was at 91 
percent of the population.225  If the NSA collected against every device in the United 
States, the program would affect 223 million American adults.226  Due to capability 
limitations, the recent scope of collection turns out to be much less than complete 
coverage. According to multiple reports, the NSA is only collecting between 20 and 30 
percent of the overall call records in the United States.227  Americans own more than one 
device on average, which means 20 to 30 percent of call records affects between roughly 
45 and 68 million Americans.228  Back to the original question of acceptability, where do 
223 NSD, Report of the United States, BR 09-09, 2009, 56–58; Litt, Privacy, Technology and National 
Security, 1. 
224 FISC, Supplemental Opinion, BR 09-15, 2009, 5. 
225 “Mobile Technology Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, December 27, 2013, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/. 
226 Bureau of the Census, National Population Projections, 2008 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2012), table 2.   
227 Ellen Nakashima, “NSA Is Collecting Less than 30 Percent of U.S. Call Data, Officials Say,” 
Washington Post, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-is-
collecting-less-than-30-percent-of-us-call-data-officials-say/2014/02/07/234a0e9e-8fad-11e3-b46a-
5a3d0d2130da_story.html; Siobhan Gorman, “NSA Collects 20% or Less of U.S. Call Data,” Wall Street 
Journal, February 7, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304680904579368831632834004. 
228 “Global Mobile Statistics 2013 Part A: Mobile subscribers; handset market share; mobile 
operators,” mobiThinking, June 2013, http://mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-
stats/a#uniquesubscribers; Bureau of the Census, National Population Projections, table 2.  
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 these collection numbers fall in relation to the public’s tolerance of the NSA program?  
The most recent number that specifically measures the acceptability of telephone tracking 
shows that 56 percent of the population approve of the intelligence method.229  If the 
government collected all phone data, it would clearly be beyond the threshold of the 
American public (Figure 9). At a decreased capacity, however, it could be tolerable if the 
limited scope was intentional. Being that the decreased collection is due to technical 
limitations and not an inherent restriction on the BR program, the intended scope of the 
metadata collection is beyond public tolerance and therefore increases the subjective 
privacy concerns associated with the program. 
 
Figure 9.  Scope of Collection and Public Tolerance 
How much metadata the government uses provides a different conclusion about 
acceptability. The usage numbers are miniscule. Between 2006 and 2009, the NSA 
provided the FBI with an average of 853 telephone numbers per year.230  While the 
program accessed more numbers through call chaining, usage is limited to the amount of 
229 “Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror Tactic,” Pew Research Center, 
June 10, 2013, http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-tracking-as-acceptable-
anti-terror-tactic/. 
230 FISC, Order, BR 08-13, 2009, 13. 
Unacceptable Scope: Collecting on 
All Americans with Cell Phones 
Tolerable Scope of Collection 
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 telephone numbers passed to the FBI for a counterterrorism investigation. In essence, the 
comparison is between how many Americans the government collects on and how many 
of these Americans it investigates under the authority to prosecute. If the NSA collected 
on every American with a cell phone, only 0.00026 percent of these people would have 
their number passed to the FBI. If the NSA were collecting the lesser 30 percent of 
calling data, then it would still only affect 0.00085 percent of the people. This is well 
below the public tolerance reflected in public opinion (Figure 10). Moreover, since the 
telephone numbers investigated and passed on to the FBI are reasonably believe to be 
associated with a known terrorist organization, the chances that a law abiding citizen’s 
telephone number is affected is even less. The amount of telephone numbers used by the 
government is subjectively acceptable. Consequently, the overall subjective analysis 
reveals that scope is well beyond public tolerance but the extremely limited amount of 
metadata used by the government is within the acceptable range, so long as the 
safeguards for access and dissemination are effective. 
 
Figure 10.  Scope of Collection versus Use 
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 C. CHANGES TO THE BR METADATA PROGRAM 
In January 2014, President Obama announced several changes to intelligence 
programs, which specifically included the NSA BR metadata program.231  The purpose 
of the reforms is to better protect privacy without degrading the effectiveness 
intelligence.232  In order to accomplish this, however, the changes would need to address 
the issues raised in this chapter. It is therefore informative to review what effect, if any, 
there will be on the BR metadata privacy concerns and safeguards.   
The new Presidential Policy Directive-28 (PPD-28) established new limits on the 
use of SIGINT that is collected in bulk, but the approved list of justifications includes the 
terrorism nexus originally required in the BR program.233  Similarly, the dissemination, 
retention, access, and oversight requirements in PPD-28 do not change the BR metadata 
safeguards already in-place for information related to U.S. persons.234  The scope of 
collection will also effectively be the same. While the reforms call for external storage of 
the BR metadata outside of the government’s control,235 collecting the data will still be in 
bulk and pursuant to FISC orders based on an authorized investigation, which is how the 
program already operates.236   
The new requirements do create additional restrictions on access. Through a 
software program, contact chaining can access a U.S. person’s metadata even if an NSA 
analyst never sees that U.S. person’s telephone number. Previously, the program was 
permitted to pursue telephone identifiers three steps removed from the one used to search 
231 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: Review of U.S. Signals 
Intelligence,” news release, January 17, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/17/fact-sheet-review-us-signals-intelligence.  
232 Ibid.  
233 Barrack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-28, “Signals Intelligence Activities,” January 
17, 2014, 3–4. 
234 Ibid., 5–6. 
235 Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET.”  
236 Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence,” news 
release, January 17, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-
review-signals-intelligence.  
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 the data, but the reforms decrease the threshold to two steps removed.237  Tighter access 
restrictions, however, were not a major problem with the BR metadata program. Thus, 
while it does improve a privacy safeguard, the change is unsubstantial. The reforms also 
seek to establish a body of independent advocates to participate in significant FISC 
cases,238 but the outcome is the same as that for improving limitations on access: the 
effect on privacy costs may very well be beneficial, but it does not address the core 
privacy issues in the BR program. 
Interestingly, the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies provided a recommendation that would have addressed the major privacy 
concerns of the BR metadata program. Tasked with surveying the broad intelligence 
apparatus of the U.S. government and to recommend changes, the group specifically 
stated that the government should conduct privacy and civil liberties impact assessments 
not just on future programs, but on those currently in existence.239  There is yet to be any 
indication that the government will conduct a PIA of the BR metadata program. 
Consequently, new and old safeguards will continue to respond to infringements instead 
of preempting privacy violations by focusing efforts on identifiable areas of concern. In 
effect, that is what is occurring through this iteration of reforms. While the intention to 
protect privacy is genuine, these changes will not decrease the privacy costs associated 
with the BR program. 
237 Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET.”  
238 Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President.”  
239The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Liberty and 
Security in a Changing World, December 12, 2013, 38–39. 
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Figure 11.  Privacy Costs of BR Metadata Program-Part 1 
Privacy Concerns Yes or No Privacy Safeguards Yes or No
Program collects or accesses personal 
information:
No Parties responsible conducted a Privacy 
Impact Assessment:
No
Information collected or accessed is 
being used for other than intended 
purpose:
Yes Intelligence products derived from 
personal information is restricted:
Yes
Information falls under a subjective 
expectation of privacy:
Yes Access to personal information is limited: Yes
Society recognizes the expectation of 
privacy as reasonable:
Yes Program is subject to Executive 
oversight:
Yes
Information collected or accessed is 
derived from activities protected under 
the First Amendment:
No Program is subject to Congressional 
oversight:
Yes
Program is subject to Judicial oversight: Yes
Accountability mechanisms enable the 
auditing of access to and use of personal 
information:
Yes




The absence of a PIA has a substantial negative effect.  Other safeguards respond to privacy issues 
as they occur, but with a PIA many issues can be understood and resolved prior to the occurrence 
of a violation.  Consequently, without the PIA there is an increased chance that privacy problems will 
arise.   
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 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. SYNOPSIS 
Chapter I laid out the core arguments in the security versus liberty debate and 
identified the shortcomings with each. Even for the most practical approach, the 
balancing act, there was a fundamental flaw: we could measure the security side of the 
scale, but lacked any meaningful framework to measure the costs to privacy, which 
represents the liberty side of the scale. The chapter proposed two issues to investigate in 
order to identify key indicators for measuring privacy costs. First was the expectation 
Americans have for government behavior in domestic intelligence programs, which the 
thesis addressed in Chapter II. Second was the expectation Americans have for privacy 
discussed in Chapter III. 
Chapter II conducted an historical and comparative analysis of Cold War-era 
domestic surveillance programs and the Pentagon’s attempt at TIA in the aftermath of 
9/11. Both of these cases were quite informative about what Americans expect for 
government behavior. The analysis in Chapter II identified the following key elements 
for measuring privacy costs:  
• Does the program collect or access personal information? 
• Is the collected or accessed information used for other than the originally 
intended purpose? 
• Is the collected or accessed information derived from activities protected 
under the First Amendment? 
• Did the responsible parties conduct a PIA? 
• Is the dissemination of intelligence products derived from personal 
information limited? 
• Is the access to personal information restricted? 
• Is the program subject to Executive oversight? 
• Is the program subject to Congressional oversight? 
• Is the program subject to Judicial oversight? 
• Do accountability mechanisms enable the auditing of access to and use of 
personal information? 
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 • Is the information made anonymous? 
In Chapter II, it became clear that the type, use, and protection of U.S. persons’ 
information contribute to a program’s privacy costs.   
Chapter III addressed a more fundamental issue: to determine where Americans 
have a legitimate privacy interest against which to assess privacy costs. The chapter 
argued that the 1970s interpretations of privacy are outdated. It demonstrated this by 
detailing the evolution of routine societal behaviors in the digital era, the increase in the 
number of parties that participate in standard social interactions, how there is more 
information being generated in modern times, and how that information is becoming 
extremely detailed and personal. This thesis accepts the twofold subjective and 
reasonable expectations of privacy established in Katz, but argues that contemporary 
society requires new interpretations of these standards in order to maintain the same level 
of privacy intended by the framers of the Constitution. Chapter III concluded that a 
person exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy by deliberately limiting the value and 
quantity of the objects, activities, or statements he or she shares with others and by 
restricting the number of people with whom he or she shares these things. Second, a 
reasonable expectation of privacy includes the pervasiveness of technology in society, 
particularly in regards to conducting routine social behaviors, surreptitious collection of 
personal information, and the level of detail in business records. That is, society is not 
willing to concede privacy interests despite the seeming erosion of personal privacy. In a 
free and open society, it is reasonable to expect that information shared with a company 
or another individual will not be shared with the government. After all, that is the intent 
of Fourth Amendment privacy protections. 
Chapter IV transforms the lessons in Chapter II and III into a model for measuring 
privacy costs. The model comprises two types of assessments. First is the primary 
assessment, which focuses on establishing whether or not certain privacy concerns apply 
to an intelligence program and whether safeguards are in place to minimize—but not 
negate—those privacy concerns. Second, the comprehensive assessment identifies the 
overall privacy concerns, shortfalls in privacy safeguards, and what part of the program 
has the most negative effect on privacy costs. The comprehensive assessment also applies 
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 a subjective review of the program’s acceptability. While recognizing that public opinion 
is not an absolute determinant for what an intelligence program ought to do or avoid, it 
can nonetheless be a useful data point on the public’s subjective tolerance of a particular 
intelligence program or practice. The template for this model is in Figure 8 and examples 
are in Figures 11 and 12. 
Chapter V measured the privacy costs of the NSA BR metadata program 
according to the model. The analysis was revealing. While the public discourse since 
June 2013 until the reforms in January 2014 alluded to unacceptably high privacy costs, 
the alternative turned out to be true. The NSA program invoked few of the privacy 
concerns and had markedly effective and overlapping privacy safeguards. Moreover, 
while collection was unquestionably extensive, the telephone information used and 
passed to the FBI for investigative purposes affected a mere 0.00026 percent of the 
people whose information was collected by the program. As it turned out, the factor with 
the most negative effect on privacy costs was the absence of a PIA. Consequently, there 
have been compliance issues in the NSA program caused by technological and human 
errors that potentially could have been avoided. To minimize the privacy costs of the 
NSA BR program, the government would need to give adequate attention to this factor. 
Upon review of the 2014 intelligence reforms, there is no indication that one will be 
conducted. Additionally, the Chapter V analysis revealed that the reforms will produce no 
substantive improvements to the privacy costs of the BR metadata program. The reforms 
attempted to balance security and liberty by keeping a necessary program while altering 
some of the privacy practices. In the end, however, the balance essentially remained the 
same. The experience of the NSA program illuminates the futility of balancing security 
and liberty with one side of the scale empty. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
With a method for measuring privacy costs now established, many ongoing 
domestic intelligence programs that affect Americans’ privacy require a re-striking of the 
balance between security and liberty. The FBI’s Terrorist Watch List is one example. As 
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 of 2011, the list included 420,000 individuals.240  To place someone on the list usually 
requires a preliminary terrorism investigation, but there are exceptions to this minimum 
standard.241  This implies that the government can place Americans on the list for reasons 
other than a demonstrable connection to terrorism. Additionally, the government is 
supposed to remove a person from the Terrorist Watch List if there is insufficient 
justification for keeping him or her on the list, or if there is no active terrorism 
investigation on that person.242  An IG report revealed that the average time it took the 
FBI to remove a name off the list was 1,112 days.243  This implies that there could be 
Americans on the Terrorist Watch List that are not supposed to be, and whose privacy is 
being violated as a result. On the other hand, the Terrorist Identities Datamart 
Environment (TIDE) database had an increase in the total number of terrorist identifiers 
between 2011 and 2012 while having a simultaneous decrease in the number of 
Americans in that database.244  Since the NCTC uses TIDE to nominate people to the 
Terrorist Watch List, the decrease of Americans in the database could indicate an 
increase in privacy protections for Americans in TIDE and, by extension, the watch list. 
The FBI also has a redress procedure through which a person can challenge his or her 
inclusion on the watch list;245 however, this mitigates concerns only in so far it 
potentially corrects the government’s infringement on that specific person’s privacy.   
240 “Terrorist Screening Center,” Ten Years After: The FBI Since 9/11, FBI, September 2011, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-11/just-the-facts-1/terrorist-screening-center.  
241 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices, Audit Report 09-25, May 2009, ii.,55. 
242 Ibid., ii.,55. 
243 Ibid., 55. 
244 Sharing and Analyzing Information to Prevent Terrorism: Hearing Before the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (March 24, 2010) (statement of Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist 
Screening Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation); ODNI, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 
TIDE Fact Sheet, accessed February 28, 2014 and July 16, 2013, 
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Tide_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
245 Five Years after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act: Stopping Terrorist Travel: 
Hearing Before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 
(December 9, 2009) (statement of Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation).  
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 Notably, the FBI has improved on the issues addressed by the IG report.246  These 
changes will not necessarily make the privacy costs tolerable. To determine the adequacy 
of the balance between security and liberty of the Terrorist Watch List requires an overall 
analysis of the privacy costs. Perhaps measuring these costs will identify areas for reform 
or perhaps the costs will be accepted for what they are. Either way, we cannot say that its 
security interest is accurately balanced against the privacy costs until that happens. 
Similar to the NSA BR metadata program, the National Security Letters (NSLs) 
and the FISA 702 programs were also targets of the 2014 intelligence reforms.247  
Whether those changes will substantively mitigate privacy concerns requires a full 
understanding of the privacy costs. Will allowing companies to provide information 
about how many times they receive NSLs nullify the privacy concerns that exist?  Is 
protecting incidental collection of U.S. person information that occurs in the FISA 702 
program worth a possible decrease in intelligence efficiency?  In the end, the presence of 
privacy costs does not always necessitate reforms. Changes that significantly affect how a 
program operates or that potentially decrease its effectiveness in the name of privacy 
concerns are not always desirable. Part of the nature of costs is what we are willing to 
give up in one area in order to gain in another. It is about the tough decision society must 
make: are the losses here worth the gains elsewhere?  Sometimes the privacy costs will 
simply capture what the balance requires; it will reflect what privacy infringements must 
occur through an intelligence program in order to benefit security. Indeed, that is the 
debate to have and with a way to measure privacy costs, that is where this conversation 
goes next. 
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although this thesis argues for how best to account for privacy costs, which 
includes scrutinizing intelligence programs, it is not an argument for privacy over 
security. Making an argument for what privacy considerations must be taken into account 
246 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Performance and Accountability 
Report, Appendix C: Office of the Inspector General (IG) Follow-Up Audit of the DOJ Internal Controls 
over Reporting of Terrorism-Related Statistics, 2012, C1–C2. 
247 Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET.” 
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 is not to deny that the government might have a valid need to infringe on privacy-
protected areas. It is simply to get to the end state: these are the privacy costs of carrying 
out the intelligence program.   
The legitimacy of an intelligence program is inherently tied to how well it 
upholds Constitutional values while pursuing security threats. This occurs through 
striking the right balance between security and liberty. Measuring the privacy costs of a 
program is the requisite first step in reforming a program to decrease unnecessary costs, 
and the final step before posing the question to society of whether the overall privacy cost 
is worth the security benefit it promises.  
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